A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

Envelope with Letter
Brando Makes Branding, Unsplash

That is the question Judge Andrews addressed yesterday. He found that yes, a letter listing a patent and accused product is enough to state a claim in a complaint for pre-suit willfulness—the letter need not include things like claim charts or specific descriptions of product features:

I find that the notice letter sufficiently pleads knowledge for the eight patents-in-suit listed in the letter. The letter lists many LG products and states, " These products, and others made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported into the United States by LG, infringe many of the patents in [Bench Walk's] portfolio." (D.I. 25-1 at 1-2). The letter then enumerates eleven patents, including eight of the ten …

One of the questions Courts have to answer when presented with an application for attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 is when to start the clock running on fees. The analysis can include objective and subjective factors, but in general (in this District at least) a patentee has to push through multiple warning signs and opportunities for reevaluation before its continued assertion of infringement will justify an award of fees.

Earlier this week, Judge Andrews awarded fees for plaintiffs' continued assertion of infringement after (1) an adverse claim construction decision and (2) subsequent notice from the defendant of non-infringement. After the Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, the defendant moved for fees.

Judge Andrews quickly disposed with the …

I wonder when slides like these were last used in district court?
I wonder when slides like these were last used in district court? Jo Gala, Unsplash

Last week, in First Quality Tissue, LLC v. Irving Consumer Products Limited, C.A. No. 19-428-RGA (D. Del.), Judge Andrews issued the following order, apparently sua sponte:

ORAL ORDER: In connection with the argument currently scheduled for January 19, 2022 [regarding pending Daubert and summary judgment motions], the parties shall submit non-argumentative letters by January 4, 2022, specifying, in order of importance to the party, the issues they want to argue, with citations to where the relevant briefing can be found. The parties should not specify more than three issues each. At the argument, the total page limit for each sides …

Last month we wrote about Chief Judge Connolly's comments on the "sad reality" of referrals of SJ motions to a magistrate judge in patent cases:

[T]he sad reality in patent cases filed in this district is that a referral of a summary judgment motion [for an R&R] pursuant to § 636(b)(l)(B) inevitably results in objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, which the district court judge must review de novo. Such a referral therefore ends up doubling the amount of judicial resources needed to resolve the summary judgment motion in question. For that reason, I no longer make § 636(b)(l)(B) referrals of summary judgment motions in patent cases to a magistrate judge.

He noted at the time …

In a recent order, issued shortly after the Markman hearing in Allergan USA, Inc. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., C.A. No. 19-1727-RGA, Judge Andrews addressed the question of "how much weight should be assigned to a Patent Examiner's statement, in a Notice of Allowance, about the meaning of a claim."

He explained the background as follows:

During prosecution of the '291 Patent, Plaintiffs initially argued that the claimed percentage of mannitol, a well-known filler, should be calculated separately from the claimed percentage of filler. The Examiner disagreed, and, in his Notice of Allowance, indicated that the percentage of mannitol would be included in calculating the percentage of filler.

(emphasis added)

The plaintiffs/patentees urged the Court to ignore their initial statements and arguments, and instead adopt the Examiner's position. Judge Andrews declined to do so...

At a claim construction hearing the week before last, Chief Judge Connolly discussed the pitfalls of a party proposing "plain meaning" as a construction without specifying what the plain meaning is, and how that may just end up deferring disputes until later in the case. We'll have a post about that once the transcript is available.

In the meantime, I thought it was interesting that Judge Andrews this month declined to adopt opposing proposed constructions from the parties in an action, and construed the term as "plain and ordinary meaning":

Plaintiffs expert Dr. Robert Ruffolo asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term "pharmaceutical batch" to incorporate [a] regulatory definition . . . …

Plane in Turbulence
Turbulence, Joshua Hoehne, Unsplash

Perhaps the most facile musing of the late-stage (please) pandemic, is wondering if remote work will become a permanent fixture in our lives. It's become such a common topic for think pieces, that I would not disgrace these hallowed pages with another trite contribution to the ouevre.

I am, however, duty-bound to note a recent development that suggests that remote depositions may not be long for this world. The issue arose before Judge Andrews last week in Takeda Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms .Inc. C.A. No. 19-2216. The plaintiffs sought to depose the defendant's former counsel, who "purportedly reviewed, drafted, and edited the settlement and license agreements that are at the center of this …

Ouch.
Ouch. Emil Kalibradov, Unsplash

Back in September we wrote about how Judge Andrews rejected an expert who relied on a 50/50 starting point to show damages in a patent case. We noted at the time that the defendant had moved to strike any follow-up theory by the plaintiff, and it wasn't clear that the Court had ruled on it before trial began.

Now we know what actually happened. Yesterday, the Court released its opinion on the motion to strike. In its opinion, the Court explained that after the plaintiff lost its damages expert, the plaintiff tried to "cobble together" a damages theory from various facts on the Friday before trial. The Court struck that new theory:

[Plaintiff] NexStep …

CIrcuit Board
Umberto, Unsplash

Most patent litigators are familiar with means-plus-function claims, which are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (previously § 112 ¶ 6). They allow a patentee to write a claim limitation as a "means" or "step" for performing a function, which is performed by the corresponding structure (or material, or acts) within the specification.

Section 112 ¶ 6 can be a gold mine for accused infringers. If they successfully argue that a claim element falls under § 112 ¶ 6, they can then argue invalidity based on a lack of corresponding structure, or they can argue non-infringement if there is structure but their products lack any equivalent. Patentees usually don't want to construe their claims as § 112 …

In a recent claim construction ruling on a single claim term, Judge Andrews rejected an indefiniteness challenge based on the lack of "specific numerical boundaries" in the claim.

The technology at issue in Commscope Technologies LLC v. Rosenberger Site Solutions, LLC, C.A. No. 20-1053, involves antennas used in cell phone towers. The patent-in-suit is directed to solving the problem of distortion in multi-band antennas by "preventing the antenna elements intended to receive high bands from transmitting low band signals."

The defendants argued that the below claim language is indefinite...