A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

Ouch.
Ouch. Emil Kalibradov, Unsplash

Back in September we wrote about how Judge Andrews rejected an expert who relied on a 50/50 starting point to show damages in a patent case. We noted at the time that the defendant had moved to strike any follow-up theory by the plaintiff, and it wasn't clear that the Court had ruled on it before trial began.

Now we know what actually happened. Yesterday, the Court released its opinion on the motion to strike. In its opinion, the Court explained that after the plaintiff lost its damages expert, the plaintiff tried to "cobble together" a damages theory from various facts on the Friday before trial. The Court struck that new theory:

[Plaintiff] NexStep …

CIrcuit Board
Umberto, Unsplash

Most patent litigators are familiar with means-plus-function claims, which are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (previously § 112 ¶ 6). They allow a patentee to write a claim limitation as a "means" or "step" for performing a function, which is performed by the corresponding structure (or material, or acts) within the specification.

Section 112 ¶ 6 can be a gold mine for accused infringers. If they successfully argue that a claim element falls under § 112 ¶ 6, they can then argue invalidity based on a lack of corresponding structure, or they can argue non-infringement if there is structure but their products lack any equivalent. Patentees usually don't want to construe their claims as § 112 …

In a recent claim construction ruling on a single claim term, Judge Andrews rejected an indefiniteness challenge based on the lack of "specific numerical boundaries" in the claim.

The technology at issue in Commscope Technologies LLC v. Rosenberger Site Solutions, LLC, C.A. No. 20-1053, involves antennas used in cell phone towers. The patent-in-suit is directed to solving the problem of distortion in multi-band antennas by "preventing the antenna elements intended to receive high bands from transmitting low band signals."

The defendants argued that the below claim language is indefinite...

Back in August, Judge Hall shot down a plaintiff's attempt to recover its fees from counsel under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides for the award of "reasonable attorneys fees" in "exceptional cases." Today, Judge Andrews rejected several objections to Judge Hall's decision.

As set forth by Judge Andrews, the defendants' basic argument was that while earlier cases held that § 285 does not permit fee awards against attorneys, certain dicta in the Supreme Courts more recent Octane Fitness opinion changed that:

Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge "overlooked" the Supreme Court's Octane Fitness opinion, in which the Court found that § 285 imposed "one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent …

Talk about 11th hour...
Talk about 11th hour... Bryce Barker, Unsplash

The parties in Genentech, Inc., et al. v. Apotex Inc., C.A. No. 19-78-RGA (D. Del.) are set to start a patent bench trial on Monday relating to a method of treating a particular disease, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (“IPF”), using the drug pirfenidone.

At the end of last week, plaintiff tried to serve a last-minute supplemental expert report and a new trial exhibit. The report and exhibit involve a newly-released study regarding the treatment of COVID-19. Apparently, according to the defendants, plaintiffs wanted to submit the new evidence on the theory that the COVID-19 treatments may cause IPF, which may be treated using pirfenidone, thus potentially resulting in infringement.

Plaintiff's …

With this case, the hits just keep coming...
With this case, the hits just keep coming... Mitya Ivanov, Unsplash

What do you do when your expert's damages opinion gets excluded, the Court rules you cannot proceed based solely on the factual evidence, and you bear the burden of proof?

According to an opinion from Judge Andrews yesterday, one option is to call the other side’s expert—even if the other side otherwise refuses to put her on the stand.

This Case Again?

We've actually talked about this case, Shure Inc. v. ClearOne, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1343-RGA-CJB (D. Del.), quite a bit at this point, including defendant's efforts to use DJ jurisdiction to keep part of the case out of Delaware, and plaintiff's effort …

When it comes to supplemental expert reports, how late is too late?

In a case that's set for trial next month, Judge Andrews recently addressed the parties' objections to a number of orders and R&Rs issued by Magistrate Judge Burke. In one of those orders, Judge Burke granted a motion to exclude some of the plaintiffs' damages calculations as erroneous and unreliable.

The plaintiffs objected, and in the meantime, they served a supplemental damages report attempting "[t]o correct the flawed analysis" excluded by Judge Burke.

Judge Andrews not only overruled the objections, but also found that the supplemental report was submitted too late:

The report was filed less than three weeks before trial. . . . This is …

We have another entry in the ongoing saga of the adequacy of post-complaint knowledge for indirect and willful infringement.

Judge Andrews started his analysis by acknowledging his own conflicting decisions, noting that "I have certainly done my share to contribute to the disagreement, having been on both sides of the issue."

He ultimately concluded that:

  1. "[T]he plaintiff should be allowed to amend a complaint to allege knowledge since the filing of the original complaint."
  2. "In the usual case, if the plaintiff's original complaint were dismissed for failure to plead pre-suit knowledge [for indirect infringement], then the plaintiff's amended complaint would require only one additional paragraph in order to allege knowledge since the filing of the original complaint."
  3. "I will, …

We have written about the ways in which a party can, despite its intention to object to a portion of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, waive or otherwise fail to properly assert its objections.

However, an even more fundamental issue is whether a party is permitted to object in the first instance (or more specifically, whether a party is entitled to have a Judge rule on the merits of its objections). In a recent decision, Judge Andrews could not find "any reason to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' objections" to an R&R in which the plaintiffs prevailed.

Judge Andrews' decision evokes the general rule that a party cannot appeal from a judgment in its favor. Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) - which set out the basic framework for objections to R&Rs on dispositive motions - do not themselves preclude objections by a prevailing party (both discuss objections to the proposed findings and recommendations by "any party"), Judge Andrews suggested that where a party prevails on the substance of the issues before the Magistrate Judge, that party's objections may be "moot."

The Magistrate Judge recommended...

You know what they say about eggs in baskets...
You know what they say about eggs in baskets... Natalie Rhea, Unsplash

In a making a motion to dismiss for ineligibility under § 101, the moving party often seeks an ineligibility finding for all claims by attacking a single independent claim and arguing that it is "representative" of the others.

This can be a powerful briefing technique, as it avoids a repetitive slog through multiple asserted claims. Beyond that, it has the practical effect of shifting the burden to the patentee—to some extent—to show that the other asserted claims are different.

A short opinion yesterday by Judge Andrews, however, shows one downside of the representative-claim approach on a § 101 motion to dismiss. If you lose the argument …