In rejecting a motion to amend a complaint almost two weeks ago (while we were indisposed), Judge Andrews held that a defendant's own importation under 35 USC 271(g) cannot serve as a basis for induced infringement:
Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment to assert induced infringement is futile, because Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any of the three elements required for a claim of induced infringement – direct infringement, knowledge, and specific intent. . . . I find that because Plaintiffs have not alleged any acts of direct infringement by a third party in the United States, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim of induced infringement under § 271(b). . . . Plaintiffs’ argument that their …
"Pick a card, any card . . . that's our secondary obviousness reference."Aditya Chinchure, Unsplash
Judge Andrews issued a short memorandum order today denying two Daubert motions based on an obviousness analysis where an expert identified a main reference and 24 additional references, without listing specific combinations.
The analysis apparently sorted the prior art into categories:
The main point of both motions is the assertion that Dr. Lepore has not identified specific combinations of prior art for his obviousness analysis. Defendants have referred to a portion of Dr. Lepore’s report where he lists categories of references. . . . [T]he expert has one reference as the “lead compound.” The expert has three additional categories of references: (1) four that show “c-Met’s role in various Cancers,” (2) six references “related to selecting a lead compound,” and (3) fourteen references “related to modifying the lead compound.”
As the Court explained, a usual case may involve a multiple-reference "state of the art" or motivation to combine analysis, so this is not a Daubert issue:
My view is that, in the usual case, an obviousness combination requires the identification of two or sometimes three references that disclose the requisite claim elements, and (usually) additional references, which can be ...
A patent licensee must hold "all substantial rights" in the licensed patents in order to maintain a patent infringement suit on its own. What constitutes "all substantial rights" is often the subject of dispute in cases brought by licensees without their licensors. Courts faced with these disputes will often examine the nature and scope of the rights transferred by the license, including the right to use the patent, the right to sublicense, and the right to sue.
Judge Andrews recently resolved a standing dispute in favor of the licensee, finding that the license in question...
Motions to disqualify experts under Daubert come up frequently in patent cases. After all, expert work can be difficult and prone to error, and scoring the disqualification of another parties' expert can be a huge blow (although sometimes it has less of an impact than the moving party may expect).
Judges in Delaware often hold oral argument on Daubert motions, typically at the same time as they hear case dispositive motions. But it's uncommon for the Court to hear testimony directly from an expert at a Daubert hearing.
That's exactly what Judge Andrews ordered last week in Sprint Communications Co. v. Cequel Communications, LLC, C.A. No. 18-1752-RGA (D. Del.), however. There, …
Clients and co-counsel often ask whether it makes sense to object to an R&R issued by a Magistrate Judge. The answer depends on many factors. For example, why was motion denied? What are the chances it will be reversed? What is the client's commitment level to the case? What is the impact of the motion on the case? Etc.
Sometimes, though, what people really want to know is "would the district judge ever decline to adopt an R&R?" The answer to that is that yes, the court will sometimes declines to adopt an R&R, but it is definitely the less common outcome.
Yesterday, Judge Andrews did just that: he declined to adopt an R&R on a motion …
We've written a lot on the developing case law in Delaware around willfulness and motions to dismiss. Willfulness requires knowledge of the infringement, and some of our judges have dismissed willfulness claims because the filing of a complaint for patent infringement cannot serve as the basis of knowledge of infringement.
Today, Judge Andrews followed that case law, and dismissed a willfulness claim in an amended complaint, stating that the original complaint cannot serve as a basis for establishing knowledge:
iFIT also alleges that Peloton knew of the '407 patent as of the filing of its original complaint. . . . I think this is irrelevant. My view is that an amended complaint cannot rely upon the …
In a brief order issued last week, Judge Andrews denied a plaintiff's request that the defendant be ordered to re-produce tens of thousands of redacted documents from its production in unredacted form. According to the order, the defendant had produced 24000+ documents with redactions. The parties had agreed, via the protective order, that confidential information irrelevant to the case at hand or information not otherwise discoverable could be redacted.
Jeff Castellano
Nonetheless, plaintiff argued that the defendant's "voluntary production of the fully-redacted documents inherently admits that they contain responsive material … Something underneath these full-document redactions must be responsive, or [defendant] would not have produced the documents."
In reliance on a sworn declaration from defendant's attorney and his own review of a sampling of the redacted documents, Judge Andrews concluded that there was no basis on which to find the redactions were inappropriate:
After reviewing the unredacted version of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A, I have concluded that [defendant's] justifications for its redactions to Exhibit A – that the first document pertained to a different product and that the second document and the redacted portions of the third document are covered by the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege – are sound. [Plaintiff] has given me no reason to doubt that a review of the remaining redacted documents would produce similar results and no reason to question the trustworthiness of Mr. Barry’s sworn declaration.
Notably, defendant's counsel Mr. Barry stated in his declaration that he had "personally reviewed" all of the redacted documents and had identified 39 that were erroneously redacted. It appears that the declaration went some way to reassuring Judge Andrews that the redactions were not overdone. ...
Bay Materials, LLC v. 3M Company, C.A. No. 21-1610-RGA (D. Del.) is a competitor patent infringement case where a smaller company is trying to prevent a larger competitor—3M—from allegedly copying its "flagship product," a "multilayer polymer sheet material" called "Zendura™ FLX."
The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction immediately upon filing the case, and the parties filed a stipulation agreeing to a discovery and briefing schedule. The parties disputed whether the defendant should be able to take an FRCP 30(b)(6) deposition of the plaintiff as part of the preliminary injunction discovery.
Defendant sought the 15-topic FRCP 30(b)(6) deposition to prevent plaintiffs' witnesses from "claim[ing] a lack of knowledge about relevant topics." Plaintiff argued that the notice was …
Judge Andrews resolved a request for a permanent injunction in a patent case today, in a way I haven't seen before.
In Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1390-RGA (D. Del.), the plaintiff won an infringement jury verdict in a trial last month.
The patents involve mixing gasoline with butane automatically, rather than through a process that involves manual intervention. The accused infringement involves the mixing of gasoline and butane on a pipeline.
Plaintiff immediately moved for a permanent injunction, and sought a hearing on the injunction on December 22 or 23, just before the holidays. The patent relevant to the permanent injunction expires in April …
On Tuesday, Judge Andrews issued what I believe is the first opinion in the district regarding "skinny labels" since the Federal Circuit issued its decision in GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
As anyone immersed enough in patent law to read this blog will know, skinny labeling is the practice of excluding certain indications from the generic drug's label and associated inserts, so as to avoid inducing infringement of method of treatment patents listed in the orange book. In Amarin Pharma, Inc. et al v. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., C.A. No. 20-1630-RGA, D.I. 97 (D. Del. Jan. 4, 2022), for instance, the branded drug was indicated for treatment of severe …
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