A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Although the trend in D. Del. is to grant IPR stays post-institution, the inverse is also true: pre-institution have become much more difficult to obtain.

In an oral order denying a pre-institution stay last Thursday, Judge Burke took the opportunity to reiterate why these motions are generally denied:

[W]ith regard to the simplification factor, the Court (absent some unique circumstance not present here) does not see the wisdom in staying a case that is otherwise proceeding forward (with a schedule already in place), in favor of the occurrence of an event (grant of an IPR petition and subsequent institution of an IPR) that has not happened yet. The Court also notes that although, as a statistical …

Hopefully we can all stop seeing this image soon!
Hopefully we can all stop seeing this image soon! CDC / Alissa Eckert, MS; Dan Higgins, MAMS

Today the Court announced that it is proceeding to Phase 3 of the Court's reopening plan. According to the order, this means:

  • Simultaneous jury trials (!)
  • Reduction to 3 feet of social distancing
  • Masking required in all common areas
  • Masking in the courtroom is up to the individual judges

According to the Court's re-opening plan, this may also include a return to full staffing of the Clerk's Office (I'm not certain that hasn't already happened).

As set forth in the order, Phase 3 will start on June 7, 2021 which I believe is the start of the next scheduled jury trial.

The …

It is not uncommon for patent infringement plaintiffs naming multiple defendants to group those defendants in the complaint and make allegations of infringement generally, rather than separately detailing what wrongful acts each defendant is alleged to have done. The group pleading approach is not "impermissible per se," as Judge Burke recognized in a recent R&R, claims based on group pleading are subject to dismissal where they do not include "'enough facts to render it plausible that each defendant has performed at least one type of U.S.-related infringing act' or if it otherwise fails to provide each defendant with sufficient notice of the basis for the claims against it."

Yesterday, Chief Judge Stark addressed whether "judicial estoppel" prevents a defendant from taking one position in an uninstituted IPR petition and asserting a contradictory position during claim construction in the district court:

[Plaintiff] Sequoia contends that [defendant] Red Hat is judicially estopped from arguing for a narrower construction than it proposed during the IPR . . . . Judicial estoppel is only appropriate when: (1) the party to be estopped is asserting a position that is irreconcilably inconsistent with one she previously asserted; (2) the party changed her position in bad faith, i.e., with an intent to play fast and loose with the court, and (3) the use of judicial estoppel is tailored to address the affront to the …

In Delaware, Local Rule 7.1.2(b) sets deadlines for responding to motions, and states that

Except for the citation of subsequent authorities, no additional papers [other than the opening, answering, and reply briefs] shall be filed absent Court approval.

Based on this rule, parties file "notices of subsequent authorities" to present after-arising citations (and sometimes other content) to the Court.

But some attorneys disagree about just how much argument can accompany the "citation[s]" a notice of subsequent authority. The authority is mixed.

In some cases, the Court has declined to consider notices containing argument that are filed without leave. See, e.g., Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, C.A. No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23215, at *51 …

Checkered Flag
Bas van den Eijkhof, Unsplash

Default judgments are uncommon in Delaware patent cases. In the rare instance where a defendant misses an answer deadline, the issue is typically resolved with minimal court intervention, either because the plaintiff agrees to an extension or the court sets aside the entry of default.

But in a recent case against Aston Martin, LLC (brought by Display Technologies, LLC), it appears that a default judgment might actually be moving forward. (Side note: it isn't clear to us whether the correct legal entity was sued or served, and we take no position on that front.)

The complaint was filed in February 2020, the summons was served in May, and the clerk entered a default in July. The plaintiff eventually moved for a default judgment in December, seeking an award of $75,000 to $1 million (based on damages estimates from a client affidavit).

On Monday, Judge Andrews recognized that it would "be necessary to have a hearing in order to determine the amount of damages[,]" but made clear that he wasn't going to take the plaintiff's word for the damages number ...

In a recent order, Judge Stark ruled that evidence of willfulness would come in during the liability phase of a jury trial in which liability and damages are being tried separately. The ruling was one of several issued in the lead up to the June jury trial in Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1390-LPS.

In his ruling, Judge Stark noted that "[t]he Court's interest in conservation of resources disfavors Defendants' request,"...

The Federal Circuit's 2008 decision in O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) comes up frequently in patent cases. Its holding is sometimes shorthanded as "you can't argue claim construction to the jury" or "the Court must construe claim limitations if they are disputed."

Judge Noreika rejected one such shorthanding of the 02 Micro rule today, pointing out that the actual O2 Micro ruling is more nuanced than parties sometimes think:

Defendant asserts that “when parties dispute a term appearing in the body of the claims, it must be construed.” (D.I. 90 at 2 (citing O2 Micro . . . )). That statement of law is incorrect. Rather, the Federal …

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David Clode, Unsplash

In Reputation.com, Inc. v. Birdeye, Inc., C.A. No. 21-129-LPS (D. Del.), the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction.

Judge Stark referred the PI motion to Judge Burke, who held an initial status conference and set a truncated schedule for PI discovery. The scheduling order set deadlines for PI discovery and supplemental briefing to be completed within 4 months.

Shortly after the PI motion, defendant moved to dismiss on § 101 grounds; in response, the plaintiff amended the complaint.

After the amendment, the Court issued an oral order sua sponte denying the motion to dismiss as moot—a common practice among some D. Del. judges (these orders helpfully make explicit that the pending motion …

Last month, we took a look at how the different judges handle indefiniteness at Markman, a question that comes up a lot.

We reported that every judge will hear argument about indefiniteness issues at Markman. But in the Judge Connolly specific section, we noted that he has never held a term indefinite in a Markman opinion, and has instead deferred ruling on the issue until summary judgment (citing two examples). See the full post for details.

Yesterday, at a hearing, Judge Connolly mentioned a blog post and stated that the post was incorrect in suggesting that he considers indefiniteness at Markman. He clarified that he does not permit indefiniteness argument at Markman. Instead, he might entertain early …