A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Judge Noreika Permits Service on Foreign Defendant by E-mail; Holds That Hague Convention Does Not Prohibit E-mail Service

Andrew E. Russell, June 13, 2021
Hague FRCP 4

You've got . . . 2 new complaints!
You've got . . . 2 new complaints! Brett Jordan, Unsplash

We talked earlier this year about how Judge Hall permitted e-mail service of a complaint to a Taiwanese corporation under FRCP 4(f)(3), and we wondered whether this may be a reliable way to skirt cumbersome foreign service issues going forward.

As of Friday, the answer is still trending towards "yes." The previous case involved Taiwan, which is not a party to the Hague Convention. On Friday, Judge Noreika permitted service via e-mail on the U.S.-based counsel of a Korean entity—a party to the Hague convention—sidestepping the need to engage in cumbersome and time-consuming international service procedures:

Pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3), the Court may order that …
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The Intersection of Marking and Pleading

Nathan R. Hoeschen, June 10, 2021
FRCP 12 FRCP 12(c)

It's fairly common for plaintiffs in Delaware to plead infringement by alleging that the defendant infringes "at least claim x," of the relevant patent—leaving the question of what other claims might be asserted until later in the case.

In line with the Federal Circuit decision in Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018), many of our Delaware judges have explicitly endorsed this practice. See, e.g. Promos Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Civil Action No. 18-307-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186276, at *6 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2018) ("Plaintiff does provide details of at least one claim allegedly infringed under each asserted patent. Therefore, Plaintiff's identification of infringed …

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Judge Connolly Rejects Effort to Assert Indirect Infringement Based on Post-Complaint Knowledge

David M. Fry, June 9, 2021
Willfulness R&R

Stop Sign
Luke van Zyl, Unsplash

Back in March, we noted Judge Connolly's adoption of a bright-line rule regarding reliance on post-complaint knowledge for indirect and willful infringement allegations:

[I]n the absence of binding authority to the contrary from the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, I will adopt the rule that the operative complaint in a lawsuit fails to state a claim for indirect patent infringement where the defendant's alleged knowledge of the asserted patents is based solely on the content of that complaint or a prior version of the complaint filed in the same lawsuit. And I conclude that the operative complaint in a lawsuit fails to state a claim for willfulness-based enhanced damages under § 284 where the …
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Unsworn Declarations in the District of Delaware

Jeff Castellano, June 8, 2021
Declarations KB

Not this declaration
Not this declaration Engraving by William J. Stone

Declarations are commonplace in federal court litigation. They are submitted by attorneys, by experts, and by parties or their agents. Their purposes range from simply listing exhibits to establishing critical facts. But what language is required for an unsworn declaration? And are declarations always necessary in D. Del.?

Unsworn Declarations In General

The vast majority of declarations submitted in federal court litigation are actually "unsworn declarations" which, by statute, a litigant may submit in place of a sworn declaration or affidavit.

Don't Forget the Required Language

In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides that ...

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What Can Parties Stipulate to in the District of Delaware? And When Do Parties Have to File a Stipulation?

Andrew E. Russell, June 6, 2021
FRCP 15 FRCP 12

You may not realize the dangers with certain stips.
You may not realize the dangers with certain stips. Andrew E. Russell, CC BY 2.0

It was a bit of a slow week as far as opinions from the District of Delaware, so I wanted to write a short post about stipulations, covering a few questions that sometimes come up.

What Can You Do by Stipulation in D. Del.?

In the District of Delaware, most litigation-related matters or facts can potentially be stipulated to. This includes, most commonly, extensions of deadlines. Parties routinely file, and the Court routinely grants, stipulations extending time for things like answer deadlines, deadlines to file a scheduling order, and protective order deadlines. Parties likewise routinely stipulate to the amendment of pleadings, FRCP 41 dismissals, …

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The Reference Trap

Nathan R. Hoeschen, June 3, 2021
Wilfulness 12(b)(6)

Overflowing with delicious facts
Overflowing with delicious facts Natalie Grainger, Unsplash

The seeds of a motion to dismiss are often planted in the complaint. To some extent this is unavoidable—for instance, try asserting software patent claims without raising the specter of a § 101 motion. Sometimes, though, you can avoid a motion to dismiss by just including a little less detail in the complaint—and especially by not referring to troublesome documents.

Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., C.A. No, 20-662-RGA, D.I. 103 (D. Del. May 28, 2021) is a good example (we discussed another aspect of this opinion last week). There, Icon brought counterclaims for patent infringement related to a series of patents that the parties had previously litigated, resulting in a settlement agreement and license. Peloton moved to dismiss those claims, arguing that the referenced license disposed of the infringement claims.

The interesting bit is that the license itself was not attached to Icon's counterclaims, but was only supplied to the Court with Peloton's motion to dismiss. In ruling on the motion, Judge Andrews noted that this would normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment motion, unless ...

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Judge Hall Blunts Hemp Processing Company's Bid for Preliminary Injunction

David M. Fry, June 2, 2021
Legal Writing Trade Secret Litigation

Plants
Matthew Brodeur, Unsplash

In a trade secret dispute over THC remediation processes, Judge Hall recently denied a hemp processing company's motion for a preliminary injunction. The redacted version of her opinion came out yesterday, and it gives some helpful guidance for parties litigating trade secret disputes. It also touches on an important tip for legal writers everywhere.

As usual, one of the key questions was whether the plaintiff adequately identified the trade secrets at issue. This requires a careful balancing act—the trade secret needs to be broad enough to cover what the defendant is doing, but narrow enough to qualify for trade secret protection in the first place.

In trying to walk this line, lawyers are often tempted to use terms like "and/or" to keep their options open. In this case, the plaintiff used "and/or" in defining the scope of two of its alleged trade secrets. This ended up playing an important role in Judge Hall's likelihood-of-success analysis:

Starting with (1), SCB’s definition is not only general, it uses the modifier “and/or,” which suggests to the Court that SCB is attempting to claim as a trade secret the idea of oxidizing THC into CBN. If so, the Court rejects it. As SCB acknowledged at oral argument, the process of oxidation, and more particularly the fact that THC oxidizes into CBN, was well known in 2019.
. . .
Although SCB’s position is not entirely clear, its use of the “and/or” modifier in its interrogatory response suggests that it might be seeking to claim as trade secrets each of the individual “parameters and conditions” set forth in its interrogatory response and every possible permutation. As Defendants’ expert points out, that's 57 potential combinations of trade secrets. (D.I. 47 ¶¶ 29, 30.) SCB does not provide separate argument as to any particular permutation, making it impossible for the Court to determine which combinations of “parameters and conditions” it intends to press.

As legal writing experts ...

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Overlap of One Patent Not Enough to Continue Stay In Favor of ITC Proceedings

Jeff Castellano, June 1, 2021
ITC Stay

In certain circumstances, a stay pending the resolution of an ITC Section 337 Investigation is automatic. But where the overlap in patents is not total, whether to stay proceedings on the non-overlapping patents is left to the discretion of the district court judge.

ITC
The USITC in Washington DC, Toytoy at the English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0

Judge Andrews recently exercised that discretion to deny a request to continue a stay for non-overlapping patents where one of twelve patents-in-suit was still pending at the ITC.

Initially, five of the twelve patents had been asserted at the ITC. Of those, three were involved in an appeal to the Federal Circuit, and just one was remanded to the ITC.

The defendant in Wirtgen America, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., C.A. No. 17-770-RGA argued that all five overlapping patents were subject to a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a). ...

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Judge Andrews Rejects Heightened Pleading Standard for Lanham Act Claims (But Notes 3d. Cir. Split)

Andrew E. Russell, May 28, 2021
MTD Lanham Act

These are not Pelotons.
These are not Pelotons. Jonathan Petit, Unsplash

In competitor cases, parties sometimes include Lanham Act claims alongside patent claims. That's what happened in Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., C.A. No. 20-662-RGA (D. Del.), where both sides brought patent and Lanham Act claims or counterclaims.

Peloton moved to dismiss defendant Icon's Lanham Act counterclaims, which alleged that Peloton had made various false and misleading statements concerning things like whether the Peloton bike was the "first of its kind" and unique among its market, along with statements about Peloton music offerings.

Peloton argued that Lanham Act claims are subject to a higher pleading standard, relying on an old E.D. Pa. case from long before the Supreme Court's decisions on this issue in Twombly / Iqbal:

Peloton urges the Court to apply an “intermediate” standard that first appeared in Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics Inc, 608 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The Court held, “[i]n litigation in which one party is charged with making false statements, it is important that the party charged be provided with sufficiently detailed allegations regarding the nature of the alleged falsehoods to allow him to make a proper defense.” . . . ICON argues that the standard articulated in Max Daetwyler is inappropriate because it was decided before Twombly and Iqbal. . . . Additionally, there is disagreement within district courts in the Third Circuit as to its applicability. . . .

Judge Andrews declined to apply the heightened standard, quoting

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A Clarification of an Old Standard

Nathan R. Hoeschen, May 27, 2021
Default Standard

New Tricks?
New Tricks? Go to Charles Deluvio's profile Charles Deluvio, Unsplash

The Delaware Default Standard for Discovery, which has been around in its present form for about a decade now, applies to some extent in every Delaware patent case. Given how frequently discovery issues are litigated in Delaware, I was somewhat surprised to see a new ruling from Judges Connolly and Hall clarifying a bit of the Default Standard that I don't believe has ever come up before.

In addition to describing the initial exchange of contentions and the format for ESI production, the Default Standard also sets a presumptive limit on the time period for discovery:

Absent a showing of good cause, follow-up discovery shall be limited to a term of 6 years before the filing of the complaint, except that discovery related to asserted prior art or the conception and reduction to practice of the inventions claimed in any patent-in-suit shall not be so limited.

Default Standard Section 4(e)

The question that arose this month in LEO Pharma A/S et al v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd., C.A No. 20-1359-CFC-JLH, D.I. 60 (D. Del. May 25, 2021), was what is "follow-up discovery"? ...

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