Local Rule 7.1.5 governs motions for reargument, sometimes styled as motions for “reconsideration.” As we’ve noted, the deadline to move for reargument or reconsideration can be easy to miss. The deadline is just 14 days after the order or opinion, and there are no CMECF reminders to flag it for counsel.
What Is a motion for reargument?
A request for “clarification” of the Court’s prior order may be interpreted as a motion for reargument/reconsideration. But a motion for reargument is not a do-over. In fact, you cannot rehash arguments you already made—and you cannot make new arguments you could have raised earlier.
As we've covered exhaustively in the past, it's becoming increasingly rare for Delaware Judges to consider indefiniteness at Markman, and it's rarer still to see someone get over the hump and knock a patent out.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Judge Andrews, however, is still willing to show a patent who's the boss at Markman (even for a non means-plus-function claim) as demonstrated this week in Genzyme Corp. v. Novartis Gene Therapies, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1736-RGA (D. Del. August 18, 2023).
The term at issue was, unsurprisingly, opaque:
Forms intrastrand base pairs such that expression of a coding region of [a] heterologous sequence is enhanced relative to a second rAAV vector that lacks sufficient intrastrand base pairing to …
We wrote last week about how Judge Andrews—somewhat surprisingly—declined to lift a stay after the PTAB left just 4 of 83 patents standing, and invalidated the rest.
After that decision, the parties filed a series of letters that clarified that the plaintiff had intended to proceed only on the four valid patents, not the rest, but wanted to check with the Court regarding how they should proceed:
[Plaintiff] Cytiva understood that the litigation would proceed only with regard to the four claims that the PTAB upheld as valid, and until JSR’s submission, was not aware that JSR had a contrary view. Cytiva had no intention, and has no intention, …
One of the more common issues to come up at trial is whether an to what degree an expert can exceed what is in their report. I've heard varying opinions on this from judges in Delaware and elsewhere. Some judges hold experts pretty tightly to their report; others apply something more akin to notice pleading, where the expert merely has to stay within the broad outline of what was addressed.
If you're going to have an expert on either side at trial, it's a good idea to know where your judge stands on this issue beforehand. We got a data point from Judge Andrews on this last week, when he issued a memorandum order on a …
On Friday, Judge Andrews addressed what happens when an IPR results in just 4 valid claims—and 79 invalid ones:
ORAL ORDER: I read the letters about lifting the stay. . . . The parties agreed to a stay through PTAB resolution of the IPRs. (D.I. 66 ). The PTAB resolution determined seventy-nine claims unpatentable and four patentable. Both sides have appealed. It does not make much sense to go forward with the overwhelming number of asserted claims likely invalid. I think it is probable that there will be a final decision from the Court of Appeals within a reasonable amount of time. That decision will, one way or another, greatly simplify this case. The …
It's easy to think that, once an opposing party takes a position on the record as to a legal issue, it can never change that position. Not so.
Today Judge Andrews addressed an argument that defendants who lost at trial were nonetheless bound by their "judicial admissions," thus preventing them from taking a (purportedly) contradictory position after trial. Not surprisingly, the defendants disagreed:
Plaintiff argues that Defendants made representations before and at trial that directly contradict positions that Defendants must take in order to prove an interference-in-fact. . . . Plaintiff notes that Defendants' representations were "judicial admissions." . . . . Therefore, Plaintiff argues, Defendants cannot establish an interference-in-fact between the '537 patent and the '207 patent, and I must dismiss the counterclaim against the '537 patent as moot for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants respond that Plaintiff does not invoke estoppel—or any other legal theory—that would support dismissing their claims. . . . Defendants add that, in any case, they are not estopped from abandoning their trial positions, nor from invoking theories that Plaintiff presented at trial, because Plaintiff prevailed over them at trial.
Judge Andrews issued an interesting opinion last week, in another case that breaks new ground on reconsideration. The (extremely) abridged and expurgated procedural history in MirTech, Inc. et al v. AgroFresh, Inc., C.A. No. 20-1170-RGA (D. Del. June 14, 2023) (Mem. Op.) is as follows:
Agrofresh moved for summary judgment on one of its counterclaims alleging breach of a settlement agreement requiring the plaintiffs to assign them several foreign patent applications
The plaintiffs responded by arguing that Agrofresh had actually dropped most of these claims. In support, they cited an RFA objection where Agrofresh argued that "[n]o claim or defense at issue in this lawsuit . . . relates to [the allegedly dropped applications]."
Judge Andrews issued an interesting order on Friday. Based on the docket, it looks like the parties had fully completed the Markman process (disclosures, meet-and-confer, joint claim chart, and joint brief), and had briefed a total of 16 terms. Judge Andrews then canceled the Markman and "dismissed" the briefing:
ORAL ORDER: The parties have submitted a joint claim construction with the request that I construe at least 16 terms including, for example, comprising and patient. I think that if I postpone the Markman hearing, some of these disputes may fall away. Therefore, the Markman hearing scheduled for June 23 is cancelled. The Markman briefing is dismissed. The …
On Wednesday, Judge Andrews issued an order in Salix Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 20-430-RGA (D. Del. May 17, 2023) rejecting an attempt to evade judgment in an ANDA action based on the filing of an amended ANDA.
The defendant in the case had won on one method of treatment, and lost on the other. It filed an amended ANDA seeking to remove the infringing treatment from the label:
Defendant filed an ANDA seeking to make and market a drug for two different methods of treatment-the IBS-D indication and the HE indication. I had a bench trial. After trial, I ruled in Defendant's favor on the IBS-D indication (as …
The objection in question actually failed under the rules on two counts—both failing to cite the relevant standard of review, and failing to include the certification that new arguments were not being raised. Judge Andrews found both failures fatal:
The first question on review is, what is the standard of review? The Local Rules recognize this: "Objections . . . shall identify the appropriate standard of review." I note that requiring the statement of a standard of review is helpful to the reviewing court. It might also help the disappointed party to consider whether it should even file objections. Barry does not identify a standard of review. . . . Barry did not comply with the Standing Order. His objections are thus overruled. I need proceed no further. . .
The Court has a standing order that states: "Any party filing objections . . . must include . . . a written statement either certifying that the objections do not raise new legal/factual arguments, or identifying the new arguments and describing the good cause for failing to previously raise [them] before the Magistrate Judge." Barry did not file such a written statement with his objections. Seaspine pointed this out. . . . Seaspine asserts that Barry has raised arguments that he did not raise before the Magistrate Judge. Had Barry filed the required statement, I would know what his position on Seaspine's assertion is. Even after Seaspine raised the issue, Barry did not seek leave to file a statement providing the required information. This is not some arcane requirement. It is a practical one, designed to make referrals to magistrate judges as efficient as the referral system can be. Barry' s objections are thus overruled. I need proceed no further
Barry v. Stryker Corporation, C.A. No. 20-1787-RGA (D. Del. May 4, 2023) (Mem. Order)
At this time, the bloggers code of ethics requires me to call this a trend. Stay safe out there.
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.
