A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


RGA
The Honorable Richard G. Andrews

Overflowing with delicious facts
Overflowing with delicious facts Natalie Grainger, Unsplash

The seeds of a motion to dismiss are often planted in the complaint. To some extent this is unavoidable—for instance, try asserting software patent claims without raising the specter of a § 101 motion. Sometimes, though, you can avoid a motion to dismiss by just including a little less detail in the complaint—and especially by not referring to troublesome documents.

Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., C.A. No, 20-662-RGA, D.I. 103 (D. Del. May 28, 2021) is a good example (we discussed another aspect of this opinion last week). There, Icon brought counterclaims for patent infringement related to a series of patents that the parties had previously litigated, resulting in a settlement agreement and license. Peloton moved to dismiss those claims, arguing that the referenced license disposed of the infringement claims.

The interesting bit is that the license itself was not attached to Icon's counterclaims, but was only supplied to the Court with Peloton's motion to dismiss. In ruling on the motion, Judge Andrews noted that this would normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment motion, unless ...

In certain circumstances, a stay pending the resolution of an ITC Section 337 Investigation is automatic. But where the overlap in patents is not total, whether to stay proceedings on the non-overlapping patents is left to the discretion of the district court judge.

ITC
The USITC in Washington DC, Toytoy at the English Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0

Judge Andrews recently exercised that discretion to deny a request to continue a stay for non-overlapping patents where one of twelve patents-in-suit was still pending at the ITC.

Initially, five of the twelve patents had been asserted at the ITC. Of those, three were involved in an appeal to the Federal Circuit, and just one was remanded to the ITC.

The defendant in Wirtgen America, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., C.A. No. 17-770-RGA argued that all five overlapping patents were subject to a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a). ...

These are not Pelotons.
These are not Pelotons. Jonathan Petit, Unsplash

In competitor cases, parties sometimes include Lanham Act claims alongside patent claims. That's what happened in Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., C.A. No. 20-662-RGA (D. Del.), where both sides brought patent and Lanham Act claims or counterclaims.

Peloton moved to dismiss defendant Icon's Lanham Act counterclaims, which alleged that Peloton had made various false and misleading statements concerning things like whether the Peloton bike was the "first of its kind" and unique among its market, along with statements about Peloton music offerings.

Peloton argued that Lanham Act claims are subject to a higher pleading standard, relying on an old E.D. Pa. case from long before the Supreme Court's decisions on this issue in Twombly / Iqbal:

Peloton urges the Court to apply an “intermediate” standard that first appeared in Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics Inc, 608 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The Court held, “[i]n litigation in which one party is charged with making false statements, it is important that the party charged be provided with sufficiently detailed allegations regarding the nature of the alleged falsehoods to allow him to make a proper defense.” . . . ICON argues that the standard articulated in Max Daetwyler is inappropriate because it was decided before Twombly and Iqbal. . . . Additionally, there is disagreement within district courts in the Third Circuit as to its applicability. . . .

Judge Andrews declined to apply the heightened standard, quoting

Checkered Flag
Bas van den Eijkhof, Unsplash

Default judgments are uncommon in Delaware patent cases. In the rare instance where a defendant misses an answer deadline, the issue is typically resolved with minimal court intervention, either because the plaintiff agrees to an extension or the court sets aside the entry of default.

But in a recent case against Aston Martin, LLC (brought by Display Technologies, LLC), it appears that a default judgment might actually be moving forward. (Side note: it isn't clear to us whether the correct legal entity was sued or served, and we take no position on that front.)

The complaint was filed in February 2020, the summons was served in May, and the clerk entered a default in July. The plaintiff eventually moved for a default judgment in December, seeking an award of $75,000 to $1 million (based on damages estimates from a client affidavit).

On Monday, Judge Andrews recognized that it would "be necessary to have a hearing in order to determine the amount of damages[,]" but made clear that he wasn't going to take the plaintiff's word for the damages number ...

Last week, Judge Andrews addressed a serious of motions in limine in Astrazeneca AB v. Zydus Pharms. (USA) Inc., C.A. No. 18-664-RGA (D. Del.). These rulings are often interesting; here, Judge Andrews excluded some former expert testimony as hearsay, rejecting the idea that the testimony was a party admission:

Defendant seeks to exclude testimony and evidence that relate to positions it and its experts took in relation to the patent-in-suit (as prior art) in District of New Jersey litigation involving other patents. . . . The evidence, which is described as trial transcripts, expert reports, invalidity contentions, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and “support documents” (consisting altogether of about fourteen proposed exhibits) is …

We wrote previously about Judge Andrews' rejection of a proposed stipulation "that dismisses three patents without prejudice so the other two can be appealed," which he said was "just allowing for what is essentially an interlocutory appeal." At that time, he asked the parties to "submit something, jointly or separately, . . . explaining why I should approve the stipulation as is, or, if the other three patents are just fluff, why the three shouldn’t be dismissed with prejudice."

The parties in Malvern Panalytical, Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters, LLC, C.A. No. 19-2157-RGA took Judge Andrews up on his invitation: Both sides submitted letters in support of their stipulation and proposed judgment, but yesterday Judge Andrews confirmed his earlier view that the proposed judgment was an impermissible bid for an interlocutory appeal, and he declined to enter it.

Judge Andrews today released a claim construction regarding several computer bag claims. Six of the claims at issue included elements regarding orientation of the opening in a computer bag:

“[pouch] opening[s] [is/are] . . . oriented in a direction substantially parallel to the planar surface”

U.S. Pat. No. 8,567,578
U.S. Pat. No. 8,567,578 U.S. Pat. No. 8,567,578

He found the claims indefinite because a POSITA would not understand the "orientation" of a bag opening, and the specification and prosecution history offered no hints:

At oral argument, [defendant] Victorinox contended that it is impossible to choose between two plausible views as to how to identify the orientation of the pouch opening; the “planar view” articulated by Victorinox and the direction pointing out of the pouch …

Gavel
Gavel, Bill Oxford, Unsplash

Last week, we asked whether jury trials in Delaware had finally arrived. After a long period of fits and starts, the answer is yes!

Judge Andrews successfully held a jury trial in a criminal case this week, culminating in a "not guilty" verdict today. Everything seems to have gone off without a hitch, with jury selection, preliminary instructions, opening statements, and multiple witness examinations taking place in a single day.

There's a huge backlog of jury trials in D. Del., and the court is still only equipped to hold one jury trial at a time (with a separate courtroom serving as the public observation area). But this is a big step …

Arrows on Sign
Adrià Tormo, Unsplash

In another ruling from the In Re ChanBond litigation as it approaches trial, Judge Andrews today issued an in-depth opinion granting a motion in limine to exclude reference to prior expert testimony from a related IPR proceeding, on the grounds that the testimony is hearsay.

Plaintiff sought to admit the material as former testimony under FRE 804(b)(1), because it is helpful to its infringement case. The rule requires, however, that the former testimony was offered against the parties' predecessor who had "an opportunity and similar motive to develop it."

Here, Judge Andrews found that an IPR petitioner's motive in developing expert testimony to show invalidity is different from a defendant's motive developing its non-infringement position:

I …

Judge Andrew's In re Chanbond opinion an Friday focused primarily on reopening discovery, but it also addressed a second issue, which I thought merited a separate post.

Shortly before trial, in a reply brief, Defendants sought production of an "Advisory Services Agreement" between the plaintiff and third party IPNav. They had previously informally requested the document at a deposition, and renewed that request as part of their motion to reopen discovery after the document's importance became apparent in light of the standing dispute. Defendants request at the deposition was apparently on the record, and Plaintiff indicated it would look for the document, but Defendants did not follow up with a formal document request:

I agree with Plaintiff that Defendants …