A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Patent
Patent

Judge Bryon issued an interesting stay opinion last Friday.

The plaintiff had initially asserted six patents. Of those, four were dismissed under § 101, and the claims as to one of the remaining patents were severed and stayed pending IPR.

The case was set to go to trial on the last remaining patent on November 30, just over 11 weeks from the date of the order. But, last month, the PTO granted a request for ex parte reexamination of the sole asserted claim of that patent.

Shortly after that, Judge Bryson issued his opinion granting a motion to stay pending re-exam. A couple of interesting points:

  • What a turnaround! Defendant first indicated it intended to request a stay …

Judge Andrews yesterday issued his opinion denying all post-trial motions in TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., C.A. No. 13-1835-RGA (D. Del.). The jury had returned a verdict of infringement and no invalidity after a trial in January 2020.

One part of the opinion stands out—Judge Andrews discusses his decision to preclude the defendant from discussing the full prosecution history of the patent before the jury as prejudicial under FRE 403:

I ruled that 2Wire could elicit testimony about what prior art was in front of the patent examiner, but that testimony about a “lengthy history of cancelling claims, adding claims, rejecting claims, [and] rejecting new claims” was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because …

Empty Chair
Giorgio Trovato, Unsplash

Sometimes people think that they have to offer expert testimony to rebut the other side's expert on every single issue. That's not true, at least when the other side has the burden of proof.

I've represented a defendant in a jury trial representing where we offered no damages expert at all, and it worked out well (under the circumstances—I'm definitely not saying it's a good general strategy). We poked holes in the opposing expert's theories, and the other side had no way to return fire and no reply report in which the fix the issues.

Judge Andrews addressed something like that last week in an opinion on a motion in limine. Defendant had offered expert …

IPR

The Federal Circuit's decision is below.

It found that even though the defendant did not receive an identification of asserted claims from the plaintiff until after the statutory IPR deadline, and even though the patents included a total of 830 claims, the statute did not allow the defendant to file a new IPR petition and then join it to its previous IPR proceeding as a way to add claims after the statutory filing deadline.

The Court recognized that the decision would result in wasted efforts by defendants in challenging claims unnecessarily:

We . . . recognize that our analysis here may lead defendants, in some circumstances, to expend effort and expense in challenging claims that may ultimately never be asserted …

In his lengthy ruling on the post-trial motions in Pacific Biosciences, Chief Judge Stark also set forth his views on whether indefiniteness may be tried to a jury, an issue that seems to come up repeatedly:

[Defendant] insists that the Supreme Court's decision in Teva vs. Sandoz[, 574 U.S. 318 (2015),] made indefiniteness an issue exclusively for the court to decide. I disagree. I continue to believe that I have discretion to put . . . indefiniteness before the jury where[,] as here, there are subsidiary fact disputes that inform the indefiniteness decision as a matter of law. [Defendant] has cited no contrary Federal Circuit case.
In fact, instead, the Federal Circuit [has] made clear that indefiniteness is …

On Friday, Chief Judge Stark issued his opinion on post-trial motions in Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. v. Oxfore Nanopore Tech., Inc., C.A. No. 17-275-LPS-CJB (D. Del.).

You may remember it as the case which made news at the time due in part to the mention of coronavirus in the opening statements.

The trial took place March 9-18, just as the first COVID-19 lock downs were ramping up.

Incredibly, both parties touted coronavirus-related effects of their products in their opening statements at trial. Plaintiff suggested that its product could "help develop a vaccine" for the coronavirus. Defendant went even further:

[Defendant made] a product that is changing lives as we speak. Whether it is helping people …

Pill Bottle
Sharon McCutcheon, Unsplash

Judge Andrews on Friday accepted a defendant's argument that, during prosecution, the applicant had so clearly and unambiguously disclaimed the prior art that it warranted construing "comprising" as used in a claim element to mean "consisting essentially of"—a major narrowing of claim scope.

The claim involved an oral tablet that delivered multiple drugs, with a "barrier layer" between them. The barrier layer claim element included the word "comprising":

a barrier layer comprising hydroxyl propyl methyl cellulose 2910, polyoxyethylene glycol 400, polysorbate 80, and titanium dioxide . . .

The portion after "comprising" in the claim element matches the composition of a commercially-available barrier layer called "Opadry ®White (YS-1-7003)."

The Court found disclaimer based on …

In an appeal from a Judge Battalion case in the District of Delaware, the Federal Circuit today held that—unsurprisingly—a jury may answer the fact question of whether a patent is standards essential.

It held that the argument to the contrary, that the Court must determine whether a patent is standards-essential during claim construction, was based on a misreading of precedent.

Buckets
Carolyn V, Unsplash

The Federal Circuit today reissued its March 2020 opinion in Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., which held a "method of preparation" claim relating to a natural phenomenon was patent eligible.

The reissue follows a petition for rehearing.

The patents involve a method for preparing a fetal DNA sample using a blood sample from a pregnant mother, by sorting the DNA fragments and removing the smaller ones using a size threshold.

The Original Bucket-Based Analysis

The Court originally described how it has consistently rejected "natural phenomenon"-related claims that fall into a "diagnostic" bucket, but has permitted method of treatment claims:

This is not a diagnostic case. And it is not a method of …