A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Patent
Patent

This week, Chief Judge Connolly denied a joint request for leave to present an early SJ motion on damages in a patent action. The parties hoped that resolution of the motion would set the stage for settlement.

Judge Connolly reiterated his rule that he will not permit early SJ motions unless they are going to be the only SJ motions, while also commenting on his case load:

As a general rule, I do not allow for an early summary judgment motion unless the resolution of the motion would be case dispositive and the party seeking to file the motion agrees that it cannot file any other summary judgment motions. In light of my case load, which approaches 600 civil cases …

"Moon flask with Aesthetic bird motif" The Met

Judge Stark today issued an opinion holding five claims across four patents indefinite, based on two terms: "aesthetic" and "similar to a light house." The Court held that both terms indefinite because they are subjective. As to "aesthetic," the Court rejected an argument that "aesthetic" merely differentiated between artistic and functional aspects of light:

The Court . . . agrees with [accused infringer] HeathCo that "aesthetic" is subjective and, accordingly, the claim term is indefinite. [Patentee] Vaxcel insists "aesthetic" is not subjective because it relates to the "philosophy" or "science" of "beauty and ugliness," not to whether something is pleasing or displeasing. . . . This is unpersuasive, in part …

Ouch.
Ouch. Emil Kalibradov, Unsplash

Back in September we wrote about how Judge Andrews rejected an expert who relied on a 50/50 starting point to show damages in a patent case. We noted at the time that the defendant had moved to strike any follow-up theory by the plaintiff, and it wasn't clear that the Court had ruled on it before trial began.

Now we know what actually happened. Yesterday, the Court released its opinion on the motion to strike. In its opinion, the Court explained that after the plaintiff lost its damages expert, the plaintiff tried to "cobble together" a damages theory from various facts on the Friday before trial. The Court struck that new theory:

[Plaintiff] NexStep …

CIrcuit Board
Umberto, Unsplash

Most patent litigators are familiar with means-plus-function claims, which are defined by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (previously § 112 ¶ 6). They allow a patentee to write a claim limitation as a "means" or "step" for performing a function, which is performed by the corresponding structure (or material, or acts) within the specification.

Section 112 ¶ 6 can be a gold mine for accused infringers. If they successfully argue that a claim element falls under § 112 ¶ 6, they can then argue invalidity based on a lack of corresponding structure, or they can argue non-infringement if there is structure but their products lack any equivalent. Patentees usually don't want to construe their claims as § 112 …

No Trespassing
Bruno Figueiredo, Unsplash

Here's something you don't see every day. Judge Noreika today remanded a case with a DJ claim seeking a “determination that Nokia’s patent rights are exhausted” back to the Delaware Court of Chancery where it was initially filed.

Continental Automotive Systems requested that determination in its breach of contract complaint, which it filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Continental claims that Nokia's patents are subject to FRAND obligations, and that it breached a contract by failing to offer licenses to patents on FRAND terms.

Judge Noreika held that because patent exhaustion is a defense, not an affirmative claim, it does not raise a question of federal law, and there is no subject matter jurisdiction ...

What's the worst they could say?
What's the worst they could say? Andrew E. Russell

It's easy to forget that, before the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, attorney communications with testifying experts and drafts of expert reports were often discoverable by the other side.

The amended Federal Rules offer more protection to those kinds of materials. But since the change, some attorneys have become much more open in their communication with testifying experts, and some experts have become much less sensitive to avoiding written records.

But post-2010 Rule 26 does not protect everything relating to a testifying expert's work. In fact, it has gaping holes, and protects only two things: "drafts of any report or disclosure" and "communications between the party's attorney …

Back in August, Judge Hall shot down a plaintiff's attempt to recover its fees from counsel under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides for the award of "reasonable attorneys fees" in "exceptional cases." Today, Judge Andrews rejected several objections to Judge Hall's decision.

As set forth by Judge Andrews, the defendants' basic argument was that while earlier cases held that § 285 does not permit fee awards against attorneys, certain dicta in the Supreme Courts more recent Octane Fitness opinion changed that:

Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge "overlooked" the Supreme Court's Octane Fitness opinion, in which the Court found that § 285 imposed "one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent …

With this case, the hits just keep coming...
With this case, the hits just keep coming... Mitya Ivanov, Unsplash

What do you do when your expert's damages opinion gets excluded, the Court rules you cannot proceed based solely on the factual evidence, and you bear the burden of proof?

According to an opinion from Judge Andrews yesterday, one option is to call the other side’s expert—even if the other side otherwise refuses to put her on the stand.

This Case Again?

We've actually talked about this case, Shure Inc. v. ClearOne, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1343-RGA-CJB (D. Del.), quite a bit at this point, including defendant's efforts to use DJ jurisdiction to keep part of the case out of Delaware, and plaintiff's effort …

Coffee Equals
Charles "Duck" Unitas, Unsplash

Most patent litigators know that the reverse doctrine of equivalents exists, and provides a way to argue non-infringement even if an accused product meets the literal terms of a claim. But it tends to be one of those issues that floats around in the ether, waiting for the right case, and it is rarely applied in practice.

Judge Connolly had an occasion last week to address the issue, resolving a motion for summary judgment of no reverse DOE, and took the opportunity to dig into some of the history of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. He first quoted the Federal Circuit's description of what the doctrine is:

the reverse doctrine of equivalents . . …

What I imagine claim construction arguments looked like
Immo Wegmann, Unsplash

Last week, Judge Noreika issued an interesting oral order regarding a claim construction dispute that was briefed—haphazardly, apparently—in the parties' summary judgment papers.

She criticized the briefing, ordered the parties to meet-and-confer and file ordinary claim construction briefing, and threatened sanctions if the parties don't try hard enough to reach agreement:

ORAL ORDER − In their summary judgment papers, the parties include arguments that either three or four additional claim terms must be construed by the Court. The parties' arguments are disjointed, do not focus on the intrinsic evidence and do not demonstrate any real understanding of what that other side's construction is. Thus, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before 5:00 PM on …