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Intellectual Property

Judge Kennelly Gives PTAB Claim Constructions Little Weight: "Not All intrinsic Evidence Is Created Equal"

Andrew E. Russell, July 22, 2022
IPR Claim Construction

Chicago, Illinois
Chicago, Illinois Pedro Lastra, Unsplash

In an opinion today, visiting Judge Kennelly (N.D. Ill.) rejected the idea that an accused infringer could bring an IPR, receive a claim construction in that IPR, and then argue that that construction is "intrinsic evidence" that, by itself, merits adopting the construction in the district court case.

In XMTT, Inc. v. Intel Corp., C.A. No. 18-1810-MFK, D.I. 293 (D. Del. July 22, 2022), the PTAB had proposed and applied its own constructions for the claims, and accused infringer Intel ultimately lost the IPR. Intel then appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits of the claim constructions.

While the IPR was pending, Intel argued that the …

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Judge Andrews Requires Plaintiff to Propose Construction for "Plain Meaning" Term the Day Before Markman Hearing

Andrew E. Russell, July 20, 2022
Plain Meaning Claim Construction

Analog Clock
None, Ocean Ng, Unsplash

One of our busiest posts on the blog is What Is "Plain and Ordinary Meaning," Anyway? And Why Do Plaintiffs Want It? This has been a recurring issue for years. Sometimes the Court is OK with a plain meaning construction, but sometimes the it is decidedly not.

Judge Andrews issued an order today for a forthcoming Markman hearing, set for 9:00 am tomorrow, directing plaintiff to propose a construction for one of its "plain meaning" terms by 8:00 pm this evening:

ORAL ORDER: The time for argument at the Markman hearing is reduced to thirty minutes per side. . . . As to disputed term D, the Court thinks construction is …
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Don't Short-Change the Representative Claims Argument in a § 101 Motion—Part II

Andrew E. Russell, July 19, 2022
Representative Claim § 101

Legos make for good representative claim analogies.
Hello I'm Nik, Unsplash

We've talk before about how accused infringers so often give short shrift to the representative claims issue in § 101 briefing, and how it deserves a lot of attention if you want to prevail on a § 101 motion to dismiss.

Judge Burke issued an R&R yesterday, following his recent § 101 day, invalidating one claim of an asserted patent—but declining to hold 27 other claims valid, citing the accused infringer's poor representative claims argument:

I will note that I [have] been reviewing Section 101 motions like these for most of my entire 11 years as a judge[;] during that time, I have resolved many, many such motions. But I cannot recall ever having seen …
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Even an Admitted Direct Competitor Relationship Is Not Enough, by Itself, for a Permanent Injunction

Andrew E. Russell, July 18, 2022
Damages Lost Profits

I guarantee that's the cleanest this car seat will ever look.
I guarantee that's the cleanest this car seat will ever look. Erik Mclean, Unsplash

Judge Andrews issued an opinion earlier this month regarding a permanent injunction in Wonderland Switzerland AG v. Evenflo Company, Inc., C.A. No. 18-1990-RGA (D. Del. July 5, 2022). Plaintiff in that case prevailed at a four-day bench trial in 2021, with a damages award of $343,680 (they sought $845,528, according to the draft PTO).

Plaintiff now moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court had held after trial, as part of its Georgia Pacific reasonable royalty analysis, that the parties were "direct competitors":

First, I previously held that "the parties are direct competitors in the industry of the patented invention." . . . Specifically, the parties do not dispute that Graco and Defendant directly compete in the car seat market. (See D.I. 195 at 2 (Defendant agreeing, " There is no dispute that Evenflo directly competes with Graco, Wonderland's customer in a large market for all-in-one car seats.")). Additionally, Plaintiff is the exclusive manufacturer of car seats sold by Graco in the United States. . . . Thus, if Graco loses a sale of a car seat, Plaintiff also loses a sale.

Judge Andrews rejected an apparent attempt to backtrack and argue that the parties were not competitors, in part because ...

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Court's Concern that "Counsel Cannot Be Relied upon for 'Candor to the Tribunal'" Did Not Warrant § 285 Attorneys' Fees

Andrew E. Russell, July 15, 2022
§ 285 Candor to the Tribunal

Truth
Michael Carruth, Unsplash

Judge Andrews issued an interesting opinion today denying a requested $9 million attorneys' fee award in Acceleration Bay LLC v. Take-Two Interactive Software, C.A. No. 16-455-RGA (D. Del.).

There were a number of facts in defendant's favor, but not quite enough to get over the bar for fees under § 285. The one that most caught my eye was that the Court had previously expressed concerns about counsel's candor—a rare thing for the Court in the District of Delaware to do:

Defendants argue that the impropriety of Plaintiff's litigation conduct-including the lack of candor, forcing relitigation of lost issues, and the pattern of inappropriate conduct in previous cases-further proves that this case …
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Judge Noreika Chooses a Side on IPR Estoppel: No Estoppel of Prior Art Products

Andrew E. Russell, July 12, 2022
IPR Estoppel Estoppel

Split
Bannon Morrissy, Unsplash

IPR estoppel can be kind of terrifying as an accused infringer in a patent action. The statute says that an accused infringer may not assert invalidity on a ground that it could have raised in the IPR; but you can't raise product prior art, so product prior art should be safe, right?

Nope. Courts have sometimes held that product prior art may still be estopped, if there is patent or written prior art that is sufficiently similar. See, e.g., Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Schrader Int’l, 432 F. Supp. 3d 448, 453 (D. Del. 2020) (holding defendant estopped from asserting product art where “all the relevant features” of the art were in a printed publication that could have been raised in an IPR).

As Judge Stark notes in Wasica, courts have gone both ways on this, with some estopping arguments based on product art where similar written or patent art could have been raised in an IPR, and others permitting those arguments.

On Friday, Judge Noreika chose a side in this split: no estoppel for prior art products ...

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Can a "Patent Law Expert" Testify at Trial? Sometimes.

Andrew E. Russell, June 13, 2022
Expert Witness Exclusion

The Federal Judicial Center patent video. I find it exciting to watch, for a moment, because it reminds me the start of a jury trial...
The Federal Judicial Center patent video. I find it exciting to watch, for a moment, because it reminds me the start of a jury trial... Federal Judicial Center

Every once in a while, parties will offer a "patent law expert" with opinions about patent office proceedings, such as patent prosecution. Often, smart opposing counsel will move to exclude that testimony, and it's not unusual for the Court to grant those motions.

A decision last week reminded of this issue. Late last week, Judge Burke granted a motion to preclude some expert testimony about patent prosecution, and excluded expert testimony regarding the patent examiner and plaintiffs' state of mind:

ORAL ORDER: The Court, having reviewed the portion of Plaintiffs' Daubert motion …
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Judge Fallon Stays Action Involving IPR on Just One of Two Asserted Patents

Andrew E. Russell, June 10, 2022
Stay Pending IPR IPR

There go the patentee's chances to oppose a stay....
Saad Chaudhry, Unsplash

In an oral order today, Judge Fallon stayed an action where there was an IPR on just one of two asserted patents:

ORAL ORDER: Having reviewed Defendant's letter motion to stay the case pending issuance of the PTAB's final written decision in the IPR proceedings . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) Defendant's motion to stay is GRANTED because Defendant has satisfied the three stay factors. See IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 18-452-WCB et al., 2019 WL 3943058, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2019). First, the stay will simplify the issues for trial because the PTAB's final written decision is likely to resolve prior art-based invalidity …
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How Long Does a Markman (Claim Construction) Hearing Usually Go in the District of Delaware?

Andrew E. Russell, June 7, 2022
Markman Hearing Markman

Analog Clock
None, Ocean Ng, Unsplash

A recurring question here in D. Del. is "how long should we request for the Markman hearing?" (when such a request is required under the scheduling order).

Parties often request around 2-3 hours, depending on the number of terms. But I was curious how much time judges actually order for Markman, so we collected some statistics. Here is how many minutes each judge has permitted for Markman oral argument, on average, over the last year:

  • Judge Stark: 91 minutes on average (7 hearings)
  • Judge Andrews: 92 minutes on average (9 hearings
  • Judge Noreika: 102 minutes on average (18 hearings)
  • Magistrate Judge Burke: 170 minutes (9 hearings)
  • Magistrate Judge Hall …
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Update: After Testimony, Judge Andrews Permits Damages Theory Capturing 100% of Difference in Net Profit

Andrew E. Russell, June 2, 2022
Damages Daubert

Red Phone
Miryam León, Unsplash

We wrote back in February of an uncommon Daubert opinion from Judge Andrews where he asked for a hearing with testimony from the expert, and for an additional round of briefing on Daubert.

Judge Andrews' concerns stemmed from an apparent lack of apportionment in the damages analysis—something that often trips up damages experts:

No one would sell the [accused] product without its numerous necessary parts. But it does not follow that the value of each necessary part is the same as the value of the whole. And yet that is what it appears that Dr. Mangum is doing.

After hearing testimony from the expert, however, Judge Andrews today issued an opinion finding that is not …

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