Judge Williams unsealed a detailed Pennypack decision Friday, where he struck an expert's infringement argument after the party failed to disclose it in their contentions.
The motion and brief provide some helpful context here. The defendant moved to strike material in the expert's opening report that apparently responded for the first time to arguments made in the defendant's non-infringement contentions. Cirba Inc. v. VMWare, Inc., C.A. No. 19-742-GBW, D.I. 1460 at 1 (D. Del. Nov. 28, 2022); Id., D.I. 1461 at 2-3.
The Court rejected an attempt to argue that the argument was "responsive" to a filing …
Yesterday, Judge Williams issued an opinion ruling on motions in limine for the trial starting next week in Cirba Inc. (d/b/a DENSIFY) v. VMWare, Inc., C.A. No. 19-742-GBW (D. Del.) (a case we've discussedseveraltimesbefore).
In it, he addressed several MILs. These opinions are always interesting, but given all of the recent discussion of litigation funding, I thought Judge Williams' order on the plaintiff's litigation funding MIL is worth noting.
Plaintiffs in the case moved in limine to preclude reference to their litigation funding arrangements:
We've talked about how it's generally understood that parties can agree to modify certain deadlines in the District of Delaware without a stipulation, such as discovery response deadlines, deposition dates before the close of fact discovery, or deadlines under the Default Standard.
We were careful to exclude depositions occurring after the close of fact discovery from that list. After all, the fact discovery deadline is set by court order. Thus, parties often stipulate to take fact depositions after the close of fact discovery.
An opinion from Judge Williams yesterday held that these stips are unnecessary, and the parties can take depositions after the close of fact discovery without any stip to that effect:
ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the Stipulation to take deposition outside fact discovery ...
It seems like only yesterday I was discussing the rare case where a third party moved to unseal the docket in a DE case. In fact, it was 12 days ago—time flies when blogging.
Well it happened again, and this time we have an opinion.
The intervenors in CBV, Inc. v. ChanBond, LLC, C.A. No. 21-1456 (D. Del. Mar 28, 2023) (Mem. Order) were shareholders in the defendant, Chanbond, who sought to unseal various and sundry filings including the complaint, answer, and briefing on a TRO. The parties (perhaps readers of the blog?) largely agreed to unseal the filings but insisted that the dollar amount of a confidential settlement agreement should remain redacted.
Typically, actual dollar amounts contained in confidential agreements are one of the few things that pass muster on a motion to seal. The twist was that the dollar amount had accidentally been filed publicly in a different case months earlier.
Oops.
Nevertheless, the parties (as well as several third-party signatories to the agreement who submitted their own briefs) insisted that ...
Judge Williams ruled on a preliminary judgment motion yesterday in Cirba Inc. v. VMWare, Inc., C.A. No. 19-742-GBW (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2023). In that case, the plaintiff had originally gone to trial back in 2020, and won a $237 million jury verdict, plus a jury finding of willful infringement. Id., D.I. 550 at 6.
The Court previously vacated that win, however, because it turns out that one of the plaintiffs, Cirba Inc., had assigned all rights in the patent at issue to another entity, Cirba IP. The Court held that the re-assignment meant that Cirba Inc. lacked standing such that it should not have been part of the trial, and that including Cirba Inc. in the trial impacted the arguments enough to warrant a new trial. Id. at D.I. 752, 946.
Yesterday, the Court addressed plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction pending the new trial. It looks like it was an easy decision for the Court, because plaintiff relied entirely on the previous trial win to show a likelihood of success—despite the fact that the Court had granted a new trial:
Rather than brief why it will likely prove infringement, Cirba summarily states that it "is likely to succeed on the merits of its patent infringement claim because it already has," referring to the vacated verdict from the first trial. . . . This Court, however, granted VMware's motion for a new trial. . . . "[I]t is quite clear, that the order granting the new trial has the effect of vacating the former judgment, and to render it null and void, and the parties are left in the same situation as if no trial had ever taken place in the cause." United States v. Ayres, 76 U.S. 608, 610 (1869). Thus, Cirba has made no "clear showing" that it will likely prove infringement.
It's not hard to see what plaintiff was thinking here. On the surface, the Court ...
We talked earlier this year about a decision by Judge Burke that struck a parties' final infringement contentions under a good cause standard, and declined to apply the much looser Pennypack standard.
Today, citing Judge Burke's opinion, Judge Williams likewise declined to rely on Pennypackin striking late-served "Amended Final Invalidity Contentions":
According to the Court's Scheduling Order, Defendants must serve their Final Invalidity Contentions to Chervon by December 17, 2020, which they did so. D.I. 37 if 7(f). On July 27, 2022, Defendants served their Amended Final Invalidity Contentions. D.I. 316 at 1; D.I. 319 at 1. Defendants did not request leave from the Court to amend their Final …
Yesterday, Judge Williams issued a claim construction opinion in Persawvere, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, C.A. No. 21-400-GBW (D. Del. Feb. 21, 2023).
In the joint claim construction brief, plaintiff asserted that defendant had waived its indefiniteness arguments because it did not include them in its invalidity contentions:
Given that Defendant failed to raise an indefiniteness argument in its Invalidity Contentions concerning terms 3 and 4, see Ex. 8, Defendant has waived this defense.
D.I. 47 at 30. In the case, the scheduling order required both initial and final invalidity contentions; defendant did not mention indefiniteness in its initial contentions, and the deadline for final contentions had not yet passed.
It's fairly common for a patentee to bring suit simultaneously against both a customer who is using or reselling an infringing product and the manufacturer who produced the product.
Sometimes the customer is the real target, and sometimes it's the manufacturer. Either way, some courts have recognized a "customer suit exception" that suggests that, under some circumstances, suits against a manufacturer should take precedence over a suit against a customer.
As courts sometimes point out, the customer suit "exception" began as an exception to the first filed rule in patent cases. But courts can also apply the principle more broadly, including to motions to stay.
For example, last week Judge Williams addressed a motion to stay …
A while back I wrote a post about the relative success rates of 101 motions before the different Delaware Judges. To prove once and for all that I sometimes ramble, that entire post can be distilled to the chart below:
Chief Judge Connolly - 70% of § 101 motions granted
But that was then, dear reader, before we had a new hotshot on the bench who is batting 1.000. If I knew how to use this site better, I would put Judge Williams at the top of this chart in flashing lights with …
We wrote in December about how Judge Williams granted defendant's motion to bifurcate the jury trial in Board of Regents, the University of Texas System v. Boston Scientific Corp., C.A. No. 18-392-GBW (D. Del.).
That trial went forward starting last week, and the trial extended into this week. As we mentioned before, Judge Williams split the trial into two phases:
Direct infringement and invalidity
Willful infringement, damages, knowledge, and intent for induced infringement
Near the conclusion of Phase 1, plaintiff moved to "unbifurcat[e]" the trial. According to the transcript:
MR. SHORE [for plaintiff]: Your Honor, we would like for the Court to consider over the weekend, not …
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