A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

In his lengthy ruling on the post-trial motions in Pacific Biosciences, Chief Judge Stark also set forth his views on whether indefiniteness may be tried to a jury, an issue that seems to come up repeatedly:

[Defendant] insists that the Supreme Court's decision in Teva vs. Sandoz[, 574 U.S. 318 (2015),] made indefiniteness an issue exclusively for the court to decide. I disagree. I continue to believe that I have discretion to put . . . indefiniteness before the jury where[,] as here, there are subsidiary fact disputes that inform the indefiniteness decision as a matter of law. [Defendant] has cited no contrary Federal Circuit case.
In fact, instead, the Federal Circuit [has] made clear that indefiniteness is …

On Friday, Chief Judge Stark issued his opinion on post-trial motions in Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. v. Oxfore Nanopore Tech., Inc., C.A. No. 17-275-LPS-CJB (D. Del.).

You may remember it as the case which made news at the time due in part to the mention of coronavirus in the opening statements.

The trial took place March 9-18, just as the first COVID-19 lock downs were ramping up.

Incredibly, both parties touted coronavirus-related effects of their products in their opening statements at trial. Plaintiff suggested that its product could "help develop a vaccine" for the coronavirus. Defendant went even further:

[Defendant made] a product that is changing lives as we speak. Whether it is helping people …

Artist's Rendering of Delaware Courtroom in September
Artist's Rendering of Delaware Courtroom in September Jean Wimmerlin, Unsplash

Judge Andrews recently postponed another patent jury trial that had been scheduled for September 21, 2020.

The ruling in Baxalta Incorporated v. Bayer Healthcare LLC, C.A. No. 17-1316-RGA, D.I. 529 (D. Del. Aug 12, 2020) followed the submission of a joint status report where the plaintiffs suggested the case should go forward, citing prejudice to them if the case remains unresolved for the foreseeable future.

The defendant responded by pointing to the obvious difficulties of holding a trial when "no witness resides in Delaware" and lead counsel and their "entourages" are from out of state.

Judge Andrews notably stated that he believed it would be possible …

I'm not sure that these are actually Georgia peaches.
I'm not sure that these are actually Georgia peaches. Joanna Stołowicz, Unsplash

Judge Noreika granted a motion to transfer yesterday in a case against an Equifax entity, where 3 of the Third Circuit's Jumara factors favored transfer, and only one (plaintiff's choice of forum) weighed against.

My first thought was—Did the plaintiff really have only one factor in it's favor?

Judge Noreika usually credits the fact that the Defendant is a Delaware corporation, and I thought Equifax was one.

Turns out, so did plaintiff. The complaint lists the defendant as a Delaware corporation. But—as the Court notes—Equifax Information Services is actually a Georgia entity. Plaintiff messed up.

So the transfer makes sense. The plaintiff is Hawaiian, meaning …

"Plain and ordinary meaning" has a mixed record as a claim construction position. Despite the fact that the claim language itself is the heart of claim construction, litigants and judges may feel pressure to define claim language that is already reasonably clear, especially if there is a dispute tied to that language. In fact, judges in this District have expressly discouraged litigants from advancing "plain and ordinary meaning" as a proposed construction during the Markman process.

However, there is no reason that the language of the claim itself - if sufficiently clear - cannot stand on its own, even if there is a dispute. The challenge (and burden) for the Court lies in sorting through the alleged disputes, discarding those …

MTD

Judge Connolly has previously denied a motion to dismiss direct infringement claims where the plaintiff at least recited the claim elements and accused a product of meeting them. Last week, though, he granted a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff did not even go that far.

Even though the patent included only method claims, plaintiff accused only products of infringing, without identifying any accused process or alleging how it is performed by those products.

Even as to those products, plaintiff contradicted itself, identifying smartphones as accused, but also discussing servers, software, and "other devices and technology." Judge Connolly called these allegations "confusing and contradictory."

Judge Connolly did grant leave to amend, and gave them a month to fix their …

Pill Bottle
Sharon McCutcheon, Unsplash

Judge Andrews on Friday accepted a defendant's argument that, during prosecution, the applicant had so clearly and unambiguously disclaimed the prior art that it warranted construing "comprising" as used in a claim element to mean "consisting essentially of"—a major narrowing of claim scope.

The claim involved an oral tablet that delivered multiple drugs, with a "barrier layer" between them. The barrier layer claim element included the word "comprising":

a barrier layer comprising hydroxyl propyl methyl cellulose 2910, polyoxyethylene glycol 400, polysorbate 80, and titanium dioxide . . .

The portion after "comprising" in the claim element matches the composition of a commercially-available barrier layer called "Opadry ®White (YS-1-7003)."

The Court found disclaimer based on …

michal-parzuchowski-oT-XbATcoTQ-unsplash.jpg
Poker Night, Michał Parzuchowski, Unsplash

On Monday, Judge Connolly issued a Memorandum Order squarely rejecting the notion that requiring a patentee to drop asserted claims for case management purposes violates due process.

Claim narrowing is one of those issues in patent law that is frequently litigated, but rarely produces a full opinion. Often, a plaintiff asserts a monstrously large number of claims, the defendant then complains that a trial on 396 claims is impossible, and the plaintiff notes that requiring them to drop the claims implicates due process. Then, everything is teed up for a discovery dispute resulting in a brief oral order narrowing the case without significant analysis.

The dispute in VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation …

Stealth
Jaroslav Devia, Unsplash

Speaking of MILs, Chief Judge Stark recently denied two motions that were, "in reality, motions for summary judgment" masquerading as MILs. Xcoal Energy & Res. v. Bluestone Energy Sales Corp., C.A. No. 18-819-LPS (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2020).

The motions were framed as MILS to exclude evidence on the defendants' "fraud-based claims and defenses" and their claim for lost profits. But they actually sought "judgment on particular claims and defenses[,]" and they didn't even mention the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The judge denied the motions outright, explaining that:

“[M]otions in limine should not be used as disguised motions for summary judgment.” Brown v. Oakland County, 2015 WL 5317194 at *2 (E.D. …