A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


DED
United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Exercise Bikes
Jonathan Petit, Unsplash

We don't see too many DTSA cases here (at least in comparison to patent cases), but this one is interesting.

In Peloton Interactive v. iFIT Inc., C.A. No. 20-1535-RGA (D. Del.), a mechanic at defendant iFIT had a childhood friend who was working as a freelance prop man helping shoot some commercials for iFIT competitor Peloton.

According to the Court, the iFIT mechanic found out about his friend's work and, despite allegedly knowing the scripts for the commercials were under an NDA, convinced his friend the prop man to forward him the scripts, which he did (along with a note "Dont [sic] forward or show my name.").

The iFIT mechanic then forwarded the scripts to the hero of this story, an iFIT Vice President of Product Development, referred to in the opinion as "Mr. Willardson." Mr. Willardson immediately shut down the idea of using the competitor's information and involved in-house counsel:

On October 26, 2020, after returning to the office, Mr. Chambers printed a copy of the Scripts from his email. . . . After reading a portion of the Scripts, Mr. Chambers brought the document to his immediate supervisor, Mr. Willardson, VP of Product Development. . . . Mr. Willardson quickly flipped through the Scripts and told Mr. Chambers not to share the document with anyone. . . . Mr. Willardson then put the Scripts in a sealed envelope and gave the envelope to iFIT's in-house counsel. . . . Mr. Chambers and Mr. Willardson have both testified that they never disseminated the Scripts.

They should give this guy a ...

The good (well, better) kind of salad
The good (well, better) kind of salad Go to Ryan Concepcion's profile Ryan Concepcion, Unsplash

JNOV's (JMOL's after a jury verdict for lawyers of a newer vintage) are always longshots. To prevail on such a motion "a party must show that the jury’s findings, presumed or express, are not supported by substantial evidence or, if they were, that the legal conclusion(s) implied by the jury’s verdict cannot in law be supported by those findings." Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). It's always noteworthy (or so we bloggers tell ourselves) when one succeeds.

This is especially true in NexStep, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, C.A. No. 19-1031-RGA, D.I. 371 ( …

"The white one in the middle is representative..." Andrew E. Russell, CC BY 2.0

This week, Judge Noreika denied a § 101 motion because it challenged more than 60 claims, and because the parties disagreed as to whether any claims were representative:

WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s [§ 101] motion does not precisely specify which claims’ eligibility it is challenging . . . , but in any event details challenges to more than sixty claims’ eligibility . . . without any agreement about representativeness . . . ;
WHEREAS, should this case proceed to trial, the asserted claims will be narrowed through the parties’ disclosures and discovery and, as such, most of the claims subject to the Plaintiff’s § 101 motion will not …

Take your pick
Aditya Chinchure, Unsplash

As we've mentioned a time or three in the last few months, in the wake of Judge Stark's confirmation to the Federal Circuit, parties in his former cases were given the option to either consent to a magistrate judge of their choosing or await assignment to a sitting Article III judge - most likely a helpful visitor from another district.

On this slow news day, I thought it might be helpful to look back at the results of this novel procedure over the past few months and see how many litigants have chosen to consent, and to whom. I for one was a bit surprised at the results, to wit:

  • Not consenting: 48
  • Consenting: 12

Our resident math majors will note that exactly 20% (my personal guess was closer to 50%) of cases consented to having one of our magistrate judges conduct all proceedings. Interestingly, in every case the parties chose to select their magistrate, rather than allowing the Court to choose resuling in the following distribution:

  • Judge Burke - 7
  • Judge Hall - 3
  • Judge Thynge - 2

These numbers are quite preliminary as the majority of the VAC cases have yet to make their decision on a magistrate, but it will be interesting to see how these numbers change and what effect, if any, it will have on case management in the district.

Sunset in Lewes, <a href='#' class='abbreviation' data-bs-toggle='tooltip' data-placement='top' title='Delaware'>DE</a>
Andrew E. Russell, CC BY 2.0

The District of Delaware announced today that Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge is set to retire in March 31, 2023:

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware announces that Chief Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge has informed the Court of her intention to retire, effective March 31, 2023, ending more than 30 years of exemplary judicial service.
Judge Thynge is the longest serving U.S. Magistrate Judge in the history of the District of Delaware. She began her tenure as a Magistrate Judge of the Court in June of 1992, after 16 years in private practice.
Judge Thynge will be sorely …

Tennessee
Drew Beamer, Unsplash

Visiting Judge McCalla has taken about 13 patent cases so far here in Delaware, including some additional assignments late last month. A reader who has a case before him flagged an interesting point: Judge McCalla brings some of his home-state rules with him.

In his orders on hearings and scheduling conferences, for example, he directs the parties to either the Northern District of California local patent rules or the District of Tennessee local patent rules:

1. A video motion conference re: Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) will be held . . .
2. The parties should refer to the Northern District of California or the Western District of Tennessee Patent Rules.

See, e.g., New York University v. Resmed, Inc., C.A. No. 21-813-JPM (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2022).

Likewise, scheduling orders in his cases may look a bit alien to regular Delaware practitioners, as he uses the District of Tennessee form. That form results in a two-page scheduling order like the attached, which focuses primarily on a few of the initial dates and guidelines, rather than ...

REDACTED PAGE
Jeff Castellano

Judge Andrews resolved a discovery dispute yesterday where plaintiff challenged defendant's "relevancy redactions." According to the plaintiff:

[Defendant] DuBois routinely applied, and refuses to remove, so-called relevancy redactions to the few documents it has produced in this case. . . . The DuBois redactions that [plaintiff] Ecolab has challenged are not addressed to preserving any privilege and are improper, particularly in view of the protective order that serves to safeguard DuBois’ confidential information in this case.

Judge Andrews seems to have shot this down quickly, holding that the defendant cannot redact for reasons other than privilege:

ORDER: By no later than May 30, 2022, Defendant shall produce to Plaintiffs all documents redacted for reasons other than preservation of …

Arrow Bullseye Target
Ricardo Arce, Unsplash

I came across an interesting discovery dispute transcript that hit the docket last week in Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Echelon Fitness, LLC, C.A. No. 19-1903-RGA (D. Del.).

Plaintiff Peloton had asserted the patents-in-suit against another defendant in another action in E.D. Tex., and ultimately settled that casein part by buying the defendant's business for $24.5m.

The defendant here, Echelon, asked plaintiff to produce various communications related to that previous litigation and sale, including communications among counsel.

Plaintiff initially refused, until defendant brought a motion to compel; then plaintiff agreed in exchange for withdrawal the motion. But plaintiff never produced the documents.

Defendant moved again, noting the prior history. The Court ordered production: …

Illustration of the stone wall plaintiff will face when they actually depose this person.
Illustration of the stone wall plaintiff will face when they actually depose this person. eberhard grossgasteiger, Unsplash

In The United States of America v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., C.A. No. 19-2103-MN (D. Del.), plaintiff moved to compel defendant to produce a 30(b)(6) witness on various topics, including on "[a]ll bases" for certain statements by defendant's CEO, including statements about a decision not to challenge the validity of certain patents.

As to two of those topics, the defendant argued in its responsive letter that the CEO's statements were "based entirely on communications and memoranda prepared by Gilead’s in-house counsel and outside counsel," which are privileged. The Court generally agreed:

[T]he Court definitely acknowledges Defendants' point[, ]i.e., …

Money
Pepi Stojanovski, Unsplash

As we've recognized before, motions for reconsideration can be tough.

First, the deadline to move for reargument or reconsideration is fairly easy to miss. It's just 14 days after the order or opinion, and there are no CMECF reminders to flag it for counsel.

Second, the standard for reconsideration is fairly narrow. As we've discussed, you can't rehash arguments you already made—but you also can't make new arguments you could have raised earlier.

What does that leave? New arguments that you couldn't have raised earlier. And those typically result from something unanticipated in the Court's ruling or order.

This week we had a good example of a worthwhile motion for reconsideration. In …