It happens fairly often in this grey world we all live in following Judge Stark's departure. Per the standing order creating the vacant judgeship, you can consent to a magistrate judge, in which case things should proceed more or less as they would under one of our Article III judges.
What's that? You're one of the surprising number of cases where the parties cannot agree on magistrate consent?
You Walk A Particularly Dark Road
Per that same standing order, you a will be assigned a visiting judge. Unfortunately, that assignment can occur any time before trial, and a cursory review of cases …
As we've mentioned, with the exception of Judge Connolly, most current D. Del. district judges permit argument regarding indefiniteness during Markman.
But what about the magistrate judges? Magistrate Judge Fallon this week granted a motion to preclude oral argument at Markman regarding indefiniteness, noting that there is no requirement for the Court to address indefiniteness during claim construction:
ORAL ORDER re D.I. 54 Motion to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order: Having reviewed Plaintiff's partially opposed motion to amend the provisions of the scheduling order governing briefing on claim construction (D.I. 54), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED-IN-PART. Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED to the extent …
A recurring question here in D. Del. is "how long should we request for the Markman hearing?" (when such a request is required under the scheduling order).
Parties often request around 2-3 hours, depending on the number of terms. But I was curious how much time judges actually order for Markman, so we collected some statistics. Here is how many minutes each judge has permitted for Markman oral argument, on average, over the last year:
Judge Stark: 91 minutes on average (7 hearings)
Judge Andrews: 92 minutes on average (9 hearings
Judge Noreika: 102 minutes on average (18 hearings)
Judge Andrews on Friday denied a fairly typical stipulation extending time for the briefing on a motion to dismiss:
ORAL ORDER: There is a pending motion of a routine nature. Each side is represented by multiple attorneys, at least some of whom on both sides are known to me to be more than competent. Summer schedules and other professional obligations are not a reason to add more than two months to the briefing schedule for this motion. The stipulation (D.I. 15 ) is DENIED. Ordered by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 6/3/2022. (nms) (Entered: 06/03/2022)
Robocast, Inc. v. Netflix, Inc., C.A. No. 22-305-RGA, D.I. 16 (D. Del. June 3, 2022).
I've noticed two similar orders lately as well, denying early-case extensions or stays and citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(2), both from Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge. First, with regard to a stipulation to extend time to submit a scheduling order:
ORAL ORDER re 18 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME to submit a scheduling order to 6/1/2022 filed by IP Power Holdings Limited: . . . By the time of the Rule 16 conference scheduled for 6/6/2022, this matter will have been pending for ...
This week, after a series of sealed letters from the parties in Evertz Microsystems Ltd. v. Lawo Inc., C.A. No. 19-302-MN-JLH (D. Del.) apparently indicating settlement is imminent, Judge Noreika issued the following order:
ORAL ORDER . . . Having reviewed the parties' letter stating that they have failed to settle the case and the parties' proposal that they engage in mediation with Judge Andrea L. Rocanelli "in the event settlement cannot be reached by close of business tomorrow," IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' proposal is REJECTED. For weeks, the parties have represented to the Court that settlement is imminent. Trial is set to commence on June 6, 2022 …
We wrote back in February of an uncommon Daubert opinion from Judge Andrews where he asked for a hearing with testimony from the expert, and for an additional round of briefing on Daubert.
Judge Andrews' concerns stemmed from an apparent lack of apportionment in the damages analysis—something that often trips up damages experts:
No one would sell the [accused] product without its numerous necessary parts. But it does not follow that the value of each necessary part is the same as the value of the whole. And yet that is what it appears that Dr. Mangum is doing.
After hearing testimony from the expert, however, Judge Andrews today issued an opinion finding that is not …
Since the Court's announcement of the current vacant judgeship program, there have been some lingering questions about what a magistrate judge in a vacant judgeship case can and cannot decide.
We got some insight on that question yesterday in Huber Engineered Woods LLC v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, C.A. No. 19-342-VAC-SRF (D. Del.). The referral order in that case is typical of VAC cases—it says that the magistrate judge can resolve only a limited scope of disputes:
this case is referred to Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon solely for the following purposes: (1) to adjudicate discovery (including fact and expert discovery) and protective order disputes; (2) to issue or modify a scheduling order; (3) to …
We've talked before about how asserting invalidity based on system prior art (as opposed to written publications, for example) can be tricky, because accused infringers can face all kinds of sometimes-unexpected difficulties with proving up the prior art.
Parties often get into sticky evidentiary questions about exactly what kinds of evidence are sufficient to show that the relevant prior art was on sale before the priority date, and how the prior art functioned—and whether that all of that evidence has authenticity or hearsay issues.
On Friday, Magistrate Judge Burke issued a long oral report and recommendation to grant summary judgment of no invalidity based on a system prior art reference. In the case, the defendants relied …
Last month, we wrote about Chief Judge Connolly's new standing order for diversity cases, requiring plaintiffs to disclose the citizenship of LLCs on both sides so that the Court can determine whether it has diversity jurisdiction.
Today, Judge Connolly denied a motion to alter or amend a judgment in a diversity action where he had issued a similar order and dismissed the case based on the Plaintiff's own "on information and belief" representation.
In Harbor Associates Limited Partnership v. Micron Devices, LLC, C.A. No. 20-1706-CFC (D. Del.), the Court sua sponte issued an order asking for plaintiffs to identify their members and those of one of the defendants, to ensure that the Court had diversity jurisdiction:
To ensure that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, Plaintiffs . . . shall within one week identify the name and citizenship of every member of [a plaintiff LLC], and [defendant] Micron Devices, LLC. If any of [the two LLCs'] members are noncorporate entities, Plaintiffs shall also identity the name and citizenship of every member of those entities, proceeding up the chain of ownership until Plaintiffs have identified the name and citizenship of every individual and corporation with a direct or indirect interest in [the LLCs].
D.I. 24. In response, the plaintiffs identified themselves as Florida entities, D.I. 25, and stated on information and believe that one member of one defendant LLC was also a Florida citizen:
Upon information and belief, Laura Perryman is a member of [defendant] Micron Devices, LLC. . . . Upon information and belief, Ms. Perryman is a citizen of Florida.
D.I. 26. In response, the Court dismissed the case, holding that it lacked jurisdiction:
Consistent with their complaint, Plaintiffs identified Florida as the citizenship of the members of the plaintiff entities. D.I. 25. They also identified Laura Perryman as a member of Defendant Micron Devices, LLC and they say that she too is a citizen of Florida. D.I. 26. This Court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction over this action.
D.I. 26, 27.
Can We Just . . . Click Undo on That?
Apparently not realizing what was about to happen when they made those statements to the Court, plaintiffs quickly moved for relief ...
More and More, case narrowing has become a fact of life in Delaware. What was once an ad-hoc process recorded in a handful of unpublished orders has become more formal, and the various by-laws and codicils that govern it are congealing into something knowable, citable, and inevitable.
But we're not there yet, and even I can still be surprised by a novel ruling on the intricacies of the process. Such was the case in Tonal Systems, Inc. v. iFIT Inc., C.A. No. 20-1197-VAC-CJB, D.I. 100 (D. Del. May 16, 2022). Following an earlier dispute on the schedule for narrowing, The parties there were set to narrow of both claims and prior art, following the disclosure of initial infringement and invalidity contentions. So far, normal.
The wrinkle was that the narrowing schedule left more than 30 days between the service of Defendant's initial invalidity contentions and the deadline by which they had to narrow their prior art. They thus took the clever step of serving a rog requesting plaintiffs validity contentions -- a response to which would have been due before Defendant had to pick their prior art arguments. Plaintiffs objected, stating "[t]he Court ordered [Defendant] to narrow its Section 102/103 invalidity case to no more than 50 prior art references
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