Interesting opinion from Judge Burke today on indirect infringement allegations, and what constitutes an "active step" to encourage the direct infringement.
The defendants in Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., C.A. No. 19-1334-CJB (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2023) (Mem. Order) sold a sort of refined coal that was a necessary agreement in an allegedly infringing process performed by power plants. They moved to dismiss the complaint for indirect infringement, arguing that, while they knew it was likely to be used in an infringing manner, they did not communicate with the end users in any way that actively induced infringement. I.e., they did not take any active steps.
Yesterday, Judge Andrews issued an opinion denying a motion to amend a complaint for failure to follow Local Rule 15.1, which requires a party moving to amend to attach the amended pleading and a redline.
This is something parties often mess up, as we've mentioned.
Here, the moving party attached the pleading and redline to a declaration submitted with the reply brief, but the Court found that was insufficient, because it occurred after the answering brief and left the Court without useful briefing on the motion to amend:
Defendants' first argument for denying Plaintiffs' motion was the failure to comply with the Local …
We're a little bit slow on the draw on this one. But for anyone who hasn't heard, the District of Delaware announced on Friday that Judge Andrews will take senior status in December 2023. The announcement notes that Judge Andrews will maintain a full caseload:
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware announces that Judge Andrews informed the President on January 5, 2023 that he intends to take senior status at the end of December 2023. Judge Andrews expects to continue with a full caseload once he becomes a Senior Judge.
Judge Andrews is an exemplary judge and colleague, and the Court is extremely grateful that he will continue to serve this institution and the public as a Senior Judge.
The District of Delaware hasn't had a judge on senior status for some time. To the extent that a new judge is appointed and Judge Andrews maintains a full caseload while on senior status, that's akin to a fifth judgeship for D. Del.—a 25% increase in the number of available judges.
The Law360 article on the announcement has some more details, including some very nice comments by Chief Judge Connolly.
We posted last month about two more mandamus petitions regarding Chief Judge Connolly's recent efforts to enforce his standing orders regarding disclosure requirements in his cases.
The Mavexar saga is getting a bit complicated, so here is a quick recap of the mandamus petitions:
Chief Judge Connolly scheduled hearings in several cases regarding various plaintiffs' compliance with his standing orders
In twoof the hearings, the plaintiffs explained that an entity called Mavexar recruited the plaintiffs and took up to 95% of their proceeds
The Court ordered some of the Mavexar entities to produce a broad range of communications among the plaintiffs, Mavexar, and their attorneys
We got a good "what not to do" example today, relayed in an opinion by Judge Williams.
In the opinion, the Court addressed objections to a magistrate judge ruling on a privilege issue (remember—you can object to non-dispositive magistrate judge rulings in addition to R&Rs. Good luck.).
As the Court explained, the defendants initially argued to the magistrate judge that Third Circuit law governed, and that Federal Circuit law was grounded in the same principles as Third Circuit law anyway. The magistrate judge agreed:
In briefing submitted to the Magistrate Judge, Defendants state that, "Federal Circuit [law] does not differ [from Third Circuit law] in that it 'is grounded in principles of fairness. '" D.I. 224 at 3. The Magistrate Judge credited Defendants' argument to conclude Third Circuit law applies. See D.I. 232 at 3 n.2 ("Because Defendants themselves initially relied on Third Circuit caselaw here (as did Plaintiff) and because Defendants assert that the Third Circuit's approach to this issue is no different from that of the Federal Circuit, the Court will herein apply Third Circuit law regarding the 'at issue' doctrine to this patent case." ).
Then, in objecting to the magistrate judge's ruling, the defendants apparently reversed position, arguing that Federal Circuit law differed, and that the magistrate judge had erred by relying on
This is an interesting order from earlier this month that we never had a chance to post about.
In Ecobee, Inc. v. EcoFactor, Inc., C.A. No. 21-323-MN (D. Del.), the parties had a Markman hearing scheduled for December 8. As she often does, in the leadup to the hearing, Judge Noreika issued an order directing lead counsel for the parties to meet-and-confer to reduce the number of disputes:
ORAL ORDER . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before 12/1/2022, local and lead counsel (i.e., those attorneys that will be leading trial) for the parties shall meet and confer and file an amended joint claim construction chart that sets forth the …
As a lawyer, I am used to reaching into my stocking on Christmas eve to find yet another lump of sumptuous coal. Hard and black as my own cynical heart, it is but fuel for engine of my enemies' destruction.
This year, however, I was presently surprised to return to the office after spending the entire holiday sick in bed to find a new opinion to discuss on the blog. Everyone wins today.
IBM Corp. v. Rakuten, Inc., C.A. No. 21-461 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2022) presents an interesting issue of personal Jurisdiction I hadn't seen before. The plaintiff, IBM, sued Rakuten a Japanese corporation (and seller of cool Japanese goods) along with its U.S. subsidiary Ebates. After suit was filed, Rakuten transferred several patents in its portfolio to Ebates, who then asserted them against IBM as permissive counterclaims. All the while, Rakuten maintained that the Court lacked personal Jurisdiction (Ebates conceded jurisdiction).
Judge Williams, however, found the maneuver of shuffling the patents off to Ebates sufficient to confer ...
Whew, this is another one that falls in the "I'm glad I'm not involved in that" bucket (some previous entries here and here).
On Friday, Judge Andrews rejected a frivolous motion to seal, after he found some of the supposedly-sensitive information as a top result on Google:
This is about as frivolous a motion to seal as I have seen. Defendants submitted a declaration of Phil Harnish in support of their motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The motion is based on the purported need to avoid disclosing “sensitive personal information about employees that, if revealed, would …
I always think it's worth paying attention to how the judges handle the presentation of evidence at trial, changes that may seem small (like bifurcation) can have a big impact on how the trial actually goes. A bifurcated trial can obviously lead to a much shorter trial, if the defendant prevails on the first phase. But even if it doesn't, bifurcation really impacts the kinds of trial themes that the plaintiff can put up, for example making it harder to paint the defendant as a bad actor from the start.
Judge Williams recognized that effect earlier this month in his order granting bifurcation of a patent trial—and suggested that restricting plaintiff from presenting those themes favors bifurcation:
The Court finds that a reduction in prejudice to BSC weighs in favor of bifurcation. [Defendant] BSC argues that [plaintiff] UT is " likely to tell a story" that UT " got an important patent and told [BSC] about their technology; [BSC] was greedy, intentionally stole the invention," and profited therefrom; and UT "got nothing." D.I. 248 at 10. That story, BSC argues, has nothing "to do with the objective question of whether the [Accused Products] meet[] all the limitations" of the Asserted Claims of the '296 patent . . . or whether the patent is invalid." Id. UT does not challenge BSC's description of UT's likely trial narrative. . . . Rather, UT argues, the need to present a piecemeal case to the jury will prejudice UT. Id.
. . . UT's description of BSC's alleged willful infringement could encourage a jury to find that BSC infringed the '296 patent for reasons unrelated to a comparison of the Accused Products to the Asserted Claims. The Court also [previously] found that "UT's evidence of post-suit willfulness is limited." . . . That finding increases the risk that UT's willfulness evidence could bias the jury's infringement and invalidity decisions. . . . When the Court weighs the risk of prejudice to BSC against the ability to mitigate that prejudice (e.g., through a jury instruction), the Court finds that the potential to reduce prejudice to BSC weighs in favor of bifurcation.
That's interesting, because (obviously) parties very often try to ...
Before we get too deep into the weeds on round 237 of the Mavexar saga, I wanted to propose a mascot. Something we can use on the site so that you can instantly spot one of these posts (you can also use the tags, of course). Having given it all the thought I am prepared to, I propose Mavexar the crab-monster.
Here he is happily greeting you and welcoming you to sit by his fire.
Andrew may have a competing vision, but for now, look for Crab Man!
Anyway.
A Missed Deadline
Following the Federal Circuit's denial of Nimitz's Mandamus petition last week, we saw our first action from Judge Connolly on these newly un-stayed cases. I had not recalled that, under his original order, the plaintiff was scheduled to produce the documents related to its relationship with Mavexar and IP Edge by December 8. As it happens, that was the same day the Federal Circuit lifted the stay.
Neither the Federal Circuit's preliminary stay order, nor its ultimate denial of the mandamus petition adjusted that deadline. Nor, apparently, did Nimitz request the District Court amend that deadline.
So the 8th came and went with no production of documents. Indeed, up through yesterday there is no mention of the submission on the docket, which ultimately led the Court to issue a brief order requiring Nimitz to "show cause as to why it should not be sanctioned for failure to comply with the November 10 Memorandum Order." Nimitz Technologies LLC v. CNET Media, Inc. C.A. No. 21-1247-CFC, D.I. 37 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2022). The Court did note, however, it would ...
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