Claim construction in this case was originally set for 2020—before the parties stipulated to cancel it.Kelly Sikkema, Unsplash
Yesterday, Judge Hall granted a post-trial JMOL motion in Taiho Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. MSN Laboratories Private Ltd., C.A. No. 19-2342-JLH (D. Del.), finding no infringement as a matter of law.
The motion resolved a relatively straightforward claim construction issue: what the word "purity" means in the claims.
The patentee said it meant chemical purity, while the accused infringer argued it meant "polymorphic" purity. The patent as a whole is directed towards crystal forms of a drug, and discussed purity of the crystal form—"polymorphic" purity—but also mentions chemical purity. The patenteee agreed that, if "purity" means polymorphic …
Unlike motions for reconsideration (or reargument, as we call them in Delaware), the local rules do not provide any particular guidance on what such a motion should like like, or the standard that needs to be met. I've often seen them criticized as essentially stealth motions for reconsideration designed to circumvent the rigid requirements of such a motion.
I've never done a full analysis of the likelihood of such a motion being granted (hope for a slow news day next week) but my guess is that most of them go down like last week's ruling in Aortic Innovations, LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., C.A. No. 23-258-JPM, D.I. 222 (D. Del. Jan 17, 2025).
In that case, the parties (weirdly) filed competing motions to extend the fact discovery deadline on the same day, presenting slightly different proposed schedules that allowed additional time for the completion of depositions and whatnot. Visiting Judge McCalla resolved the motions and adjusted the schedule in a brief oral order consisting only of the relevant dates:
ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY SCHEDULE: Fact Discovery Deadline due February 27, 2025; Initial Expert Witness Disclosures Due April 3, 2025 . . . .
After the Court extended the schedule, however, the Defendant issued several new subpoenas to third parties. Plaintiff then moved for an order clarifying that the extension only allowed for the completion of existing discovery, and not for the service of new requests. The main argument was that both parties' motions had focused on the time necessary to complete the existing discovery, rather than the need for additional requests.
Judge McCalla denied the motion, finding no ambiguity requiring clarification in the prior order amending the schedule:
In its Order Setting Discovery Schedule, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline to February 27, 2025. Plaintiff argues neither party requested an extension for the purpose of serving additional fact discovery. However, the Court used its “broad discretion” to grant the Parties’ requests so that the Parties could complete discovery as a whole. A fact discovery deadline is just that: a deadline to complete all discovery promulgated by the Parties.
To the extent the Order Setting Discovery Deadline is “ambiguous or vague” the Court makes clear: the Order Setting Discovery Schedule only established a deadline of completion and did not set out a cap on that discovery
Id. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).
The order is additionally interesting for having one of the few recitations for the standard in moving to clarify.
As a child, I was frequently frustrated by the differing rules that governed different houses. My house was a shoes-on place, while most of my friends houses were strict shoes in the bucket at the door affairs (this was the early 90s so carpet was the rule).
It usually also had a splotchy brown pattern so that a spilled root beer might pass without notice. The midwest is a practical place.Jon Tyson, Unsplash
I was instructed to remove my shoes at their doors and respect the primacy of house rules. In other realms, a visiting child brought their own rules with them -- perhaps they would be allowed a later bedtime, additional snack, or the high privilege of a PG-13 movie -- indulgences normally forbidden in my house.
This is one of the many reasons I have always hated choice of laws, and will not write about it in the blog. I will also stealthily delete any Andrew posts on it and assume he won't notice.
Today's post deals with a different sort of visitor, and an interesting wrinkle that I had not considered before.
Rampart IC, LLC v. Egg Medical, Inc., C.A. No. 24-643-JCG (D. Del. Jan. 17, 2025) was assigned to visiting judge Choe-Groves from the Court of International Trade. The defendant, Egg, was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Minnesota (probably carpeted). They moved to transfer the case back to balmy Minneapolis.
One of the Jumara factors that govern transfer in the Third Circuit is the relative congestion in each fora. Typically, this factor favors transfer because Delaware Judges have among the highest (or often the highest) weighted caseloads in the nation.
In denying the motion, however, Judge Choe-Groves ...
Judge Williams issued an interesting opinion yesterday on a motion to strike.
This is becoming my standard pitcture when I don't have anything more clever. Let me know if you would like me to replace it with a series of cartoons of Andrew and I shruggingBilly, Unsplash
The issue in Cisco Systems, Inc. et al v. Ramot at Tel Aviv University Ltd., C.A. No. 21-1365-GBW (D. Del. Jan. 15, 2025) was the form of the briefing. The case had previously been assigned to Judge Stark, before passing to the vacant judgeship, then Judge Burke. The parties' scheduling order thus followed judge Burke's form order which contained a specific letter briefing procedure for motions to strike with 3-page opening, a 5 page answering and 2-page reply briefs. When the case was reassigned to Judge Williams, the parties kept the old scheduling order.
The parties ultimately raised the motion to strike through Judge Williams' dispute procedures. He issued an oral order that allowed for only 3-page opening and answering briefs without reference to the procedures in the scheduling order:
Having reviewed the parties' joint letter requesting a discovery teleconference (D.I. 146), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 10, 2024, any party seeking relief shall file with the Court a letter, not to exceed three (3) pages, outlining the issues in dispute, its position on those issues, and supporting authority for its position(s). By no later than 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 12, 2024, any party opposing the request for relief may file a letter, not to exceed three (3) pages, outlining that party's reasons for its opposition and supporting authority.
The movant (Plaintiff) filed a 3 page letter (the correct procedure under either the scheduling order the later oral order). The defendant, however, filed a 5-page answering brief -- allowed under the scheduling order but exceeding the limit set in the oral order.
Judge Williams thus declined to consider any of the argument after page 3 of the brief:
While the Operative Scheduling Order sets default page limits for motions to strike, the parties were both instructed to submit letter briefs not exceeding three pages. Cisco complied with that instruction. Ramot did not. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and give no weight to the text beyond page three of Ramot's brief.
The District of Delaware's 2025 Bench and Bar is set for September 25-26, 2025. Yesterday, as we predicted, the Court issued an order moving all filing and service deadlines for those days to the following Monday, and directing the Court not to set deadlines on those days:
WHEREAS, the Court having announced that it will host its biennial District of Delaware Bench and Bar Conference on September 25 and 26, 2025, and the Court wishing to promote the participation of as many members of the Bar as possible;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all members of the court - District, Magistrate, and Bankruptcy Judges - will, to the greatest extent possible, cancel and refrain …
Defendants are always on the lookout for ways resolve patent cases (and other cases) early. One potential avenue is an FRCP 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings—but it only works in uncommon circumstance that the pleadings themselves show a lack of infringement or validity.
It's an uncommon circumstance—but not unheard of. Last week, the Court granted an FRCP 12(c) motion of no contributory infringement in Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma. Inc. v. Apotex Inc., C.A. No. 23-685-CFC (D. Del.), after a plaintiff's own complaint showed a lack of infringement.
Boehringer is an ANDA action. The patent claims a drug used to treat a disease in patients who—critically—are ineligible to receive a second drug. The label …
It's easy to forget. But really, really really, you should move to seal the courtroom when either side is discussing your client's confidential information.
As we've discussed before, the standard for sealing information is harsh. Under the Third Circuit's Avandia opinion, in order to show good cause for a protective order to seal, a party must show "with specificity" that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 671 (3d Cir. 2019). That can be toughtodo.
But you know what is even tougher? Redacting information discussed in open court. Then …
Back in 2021 the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am. that raised the standard for granting a motion to dismiss in a patent action. C.A. No. 2020-2218, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20624 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021). The Federal Circuit held that "[a] plaintiff is not required to plead infringement on an element-by-element basis"—which was news to the patent practitioners who had filed (and won) motions on that basis.
We haven't written much about that decision in the time since, but it's still out there, and it's something to keep in mind as you weigh your options in response to a patent infringement complaint.
I'm a baker. I was born of flour and heat and fermented in this big jar we call life. My original starter, Yeasty Boy, has sired many children that live lives of plenty. His grandchild, breAD-Rock, sits upon my counter as I type, growing fat on apple peels.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
One of the first lessons of baking is that some ingredients can be modified or omitted without any real worry. You trade rosemary for thyme in your focaccia and everything's honky dory. On the other hand, if you switch the strong bread flour to whole wheat, you have crossed a moral line from which there may be no return. Some ingredients are simply more important, and some substitutions …
We're back! Just in time to be snowed in—the Court is closed today due to inclement weather.
While we were out last week, Chief Judge Connolly issued an interesting opinion on post-trial motions in Natera, Inc. v. CareDX, Inc., C.A. No. 20-38-CJB (D. Del.).
That case went to trial in January 2024, with plaintiff Natera winning a $96 million verdict on the first of two patents, but receiving a verdict of no infringement of the second patent. The Court's opinion addresses their motion for JMOL of infringement on the second patent.
Did a Poorly Phrased Question Doom JMOL of Infringement?
The arguments turned on a single claim limitation. The Court found …
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