In a recent order, Judge Stark ruled that evidence of willfulness would come in during the liability phase of a jury trial in which liability and damages are being tried separately. The ruling was one of several issued in the lead up to the June jury trial in Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1390-LPS.
In his ruling, Judge Stark noted that "[t]he Court's interest in conservation of resources disfavors Defendants' request,"...
The Federal Circuit's 2008 decision in O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) comes up frequently in patent cases. Its holding is sometimes shorthanded as "you can't argue claim construction to the jury" or "the Court must construe claim limitations if they are disputed."
Judge Noreika rejected one such shorthanding of the 02 Micro rule today, pointing out that the actual O2 Micro ruling is more nuanced than parties sometimes think:
Defendant asserts that “when parties dispute a term appearing in the body of the claims, it must be construed.” (D.I. 90 at 2 (citing O2 Micro . . . )). That statement of law is incorrect. Rather, the Federal …
In Reputation.com, Inc. v. Birdeye, Inc., C.A. No. 21-129-LPS (D. Del.), the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction.
Judge Stark referred the PI motion to Judge Burke, who held an initial status conference and set a truncated schedule for PI discovery. The scheduling order set deadlines for PI discovery and supplemental briefing to be completed within 4 months.
Shortly after the PI motion, defendant moved to dismiss on § 101 grounds; in response, the plaintiff amended the complaint.
After the amendment, the Court issued an oral order sua sponte denying the motion to dismiss as moot—a common practice among some D. Del. judges (these orders helpfully make explicit that the pending motion …
Last month, we took a look at how the different judges handle indefiniteness at Markman, a question that comes up a lot.
We reported that every judge will hear argument about indefiniteness issues at Markman. But in the Judge Connolly specific section, we noted that he has never held a term indefinite in a Markman opinion, and has instead deferred ruling on the issue until summary judgment (citing two examples). See the full post for details.
Yesterday, at a hearing, Judge Connolly mentioned a blog post and stated that the post was incorrect in suggesting that he considers indefiniteness at Markman. He clarified that he does not permit indefiniteness argument at Markman. Instead, he might entertain early …
By and large, the view from the bench is that expert testimony provides little value in the claim construction process. It's litigation-driven extrinsic evidence, and it often plays no role in the court's final analysis. But if you choose to rely on an expert during claim construction, will you have to make them available for deposition?
Judge Stark answered this question on Friday with a resounding yes. After reiterating the general view that "[e]xpert opinions and declarations constitute extrinsic evidence . . . and are at times unhelpful," he confirmed that:
a party asking the Court to rely on such extrinsic evidence should expect to make its expert(s) available for deposition prior to a claim construction hearing, should …
In a recent Daubert ruling in CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., C.A. No. 19-662-CFC-CJB, Judge Connolly excluded the opinion of the plaintiff's expert regarding "corrective advertising damages," in part because it was based on "vague, undocumented, and back-of-the-envelope . . . estimates" by the plaintiff's CEO. The Judge granted the defendant's motion to exclude the expert's testimony under both Rule 702 and Rule 403, indicating that not only did the expert's opinion fail to satisfy the Daubert hallmarks for admissible expert testimony, it would also confuse the jury and be prejudicial because it "would essentially place the imprimatur of an expert on [the CEO] Maag's undocumented and dubious damages calculation."
Last week, Judge Andrews addressed a serious of motions in limine in Astrazeneca AB v. Zydus Pharms. (USA) Inc., C.A. No. 18-664-RGA (D. Del.). These rulings are often interesting; here, Judge Andrews excluded some former expert testimony as hearsay, rejecting the idea that the testimony was a party admission:
Defendant seeks to exclude testimony and evidence that relate to positions it and its experts took in relation to the patent-in-suit (as prior art) in District of New Jersey litigation involving other patents. . . . The evidence, which is described as trial transcripts, expert reports, invalidity contentions, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and “support documents” (consisting altogether of about fourteen proposed exhibits) is …
Late last summer, we posted about an interesting order from Judge Noreika rejecting the parties' claim construction chart for including too many terms. As Judge Noreika released a similar order just last week, I though it might be interesting to examine how firm the 10-term limit has been in the months since that first order.
The answer is "very." in the 20-some Markman orders Judge Noreika has issued since that first one, she has never once construed more than 10 terms. 4 times, she has rejected a claim construction chart for including more than 10 (14, 13, 13, and 17 terms were included in those rejected charts). In each case, she has …
We wrote previously about Judge Andrews' rejection of a proposed stipulation "that dismisses three patents without prejudice so the other two can be appealed," which he said was "just allowing for what is essentially an interlocutory appeal." At that time, he asked the parties to "submit something, jointly or separately, . . . explaining why I should approve the stipulation as is, or, if the other three patents are just fluff, why the three shouldn’t be dismissed with prejudice."
The parties in Malvern Panalytical, Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters, LLC, C.A. No. 19-2157-RGA took Judge Andrews up on his invitation: Both sides submitted letters in support of their stipulation and proposed judgment, but yesterday Judge Andrews confirmed his earlier view that the proposed judgment was an impermissible bid for an interlocutory appeal, and he declined to enter it.
As we've mentioned, Judge Connolly uses a different system of patent contentions than the other District of Delaware judges. The other judges generally use the system set forth in the Default Standard, while Judge Connolly's approach is modeled after the more restrictive method used in the Northern District of California.
Because he uses a unique system, parties often wonder just how much (or how little) is needed to offer sufficient contentions in Judge Connolly's view.
Judge Connolly offered some insight on that point today, when he overruled a patentee's objections to an accused infringer's invalidity contentions. Here is one of the contentions at issue:
Claims 1, 2, and 4 of the ’489 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § …
