Is the reign of Pennypack coming to an end?AI-Generated
We talked earlier this year about a decision by Judge Burke that struck a parties' final infringement contentions under a good cause standard, and declined to apply the much looser Pennypack standard.
Today, citing Judge Burke's opinion, Judge Williams likewise declined to rely on Pennypackin striking late-served "Amended Final Invalidity Contentions":
According to the Court's Scheduling Order, Defendants must serve their Final Invalidity Contentions to Chervon by December 17, 2020, which they did so. D.I. 37 if 7(f). On July 27, 2022, Defendants served their Amended Final Invalidity Contentions. D.I. 316 at 1; D.I. 319 at 1. Defendants did not request leave from the Court to amend their Final …
Judge Noreika is well known at this point for requiring real, substantive meet-and-confers on claim construction. In multiple cases, she has directed parties to further meet-and-confer after finding their initial efforts insufficient.
She issued another such order this week, this time directing the parties to have what appears to be a supervised meet-and-confer, in person in the courtroom:
ORDER . . . The parties did not comply with the Court's February 13, 2023 Oral Order requiring a good-faith meet and confer. Instead, the parties spoke for just 20 minutes about 10 disputed terms, as well as "hearing logistics" and a proposal by MarkForged to request deferral of certain claim constructions until dispositive motions. There is no breakdown indicating …
Parties in D. Del. patent actions frequently stipulate to adjustments of the case schedule, and these typically go through without any issue. So it always catches my eye when a stipulated stay is denied.
In Zogenix, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., C.A. No. 21-1252-RGA (D. Del.), and two related actions, one of the defendants had moved to dismiss one of the asserted patents in a related action, and the plaintiff had moved to amend its complaint to assert additional patents and join additional parties. The motions were filed in September and November, 2022, and remain pending.
The parties in the three actions stipulated to consolidate the actions for the purposes of discovery, and to stay the consolidated action until resolution of the motions to dismiss and amend.
Judge Andrews denied the motion, ordering that the parties instead move forward as if the motions were resolved in the broadest way:
ORAL ORDER: The Stipulation to Consolidate and Stay Case . . . is DENIED. The Court is not willing to stay the cases. The discovery deadlines in the two earlier cases . . . will not be extended. The parties should proceed as though the motion for leave to amend . . . will be granted and the motion to dismiss . . . will be denied. Ordered by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 3/1/2023.
We've noted before that stipulations to stay the entire case can be iffy, and Judge Andrews has previously rejected an attempt ...
A lot of things can go wrong in law. Keeping track of the labyrinthine tangle of laws, local rules, standing orders, and judicial preferences, is a daunting task. Checking and re-checking documents to make sure they comply with all of these rules is enough to make a person a bit neurotic. But, with the aid of experience and some hard lessons, you eventually come to grips with things and develop a certain comfort with the systems hard edges.
Until of course you stumble upon something new to worry about, and then you get the shakes all over again.
AI-Generated, displayed with permission
To that end, I submit to you this footnote in Cipla USA, Inc. v. Ipsen Biopharms., Inc., C.A. No. 22-552-GBW-SRF (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2023) (R&R), on the dangers of not checking your links:
In support of this assertion, Ipsen cites an "Update to Information Regarding Medicare Payment and Coding for Drugs and Biologics," dated May 18,2007. (D.I. 23 at 4 n.4) A document by the same name and having the same date is referenced in Cipla's complaint. (D.I. 1 at [Paragraph] 5c) To the extent that these documents are, in fact, the same, the court may consider them as "matters incorporated by reference" into the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See Kickjlip, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (D. Del. 2013). In this case, however, there are different hyperlinks associated with the document in the complaint and in Ipsen's reply brief. (Compare D.I. 1 at, 5c with D.I. 23 at 4 n.4) The hyperlink in the complaint functions, whereas the hyperlink in the reply brief does not. Ipsen does not set forth any basis for the court's consideration of the material, and the court cannot independently verify whether this material is the same as the document referenced in the complaint due to the defective hyperlink.
Id. at 7 n.4.
Oof. To Summarize here -- the defendant moved to dismiss and cited a document that was linked in, but not attached to, the complaint. The Court declined to consider it, because the link in the brief was ...
In WSOU Investments, LLC v. SalesForce, Inc., C.A. No. 23-27-CFC (D. Del. Feb. 23, 2023), one of the parties filed a "motion for leave to file under seal" some of its briefing, exhibits, and—notably—its Rule 7.1 statement.
The case is a small miscellaneous action seeking to compel discovery relating to a W.D. Tex. patent action.
In response to the motion for leave to file under seal, Chief Judge Connolly elected to review all sealed filings on the docket. He went so far as to follow up with the judge in the underlying W.D. Texas action:
WSOU's motion for leave to file under seal prompted me to review all the filings the parties have maintained under seal to date.
I started with the parties' briefs (D.I. 3; D.I. 16; D.I. 20); and, because the parties justified the sealing of those briefs in part because the briefs quote from a sealed discovery hearing conducted by Judge Gilliland in the Western District of Texas, I shared copies of the briefs with Judge Gilliland to get his views on the appropriateness of maintaining the briefs under seal. I determined, and Judge Gilliland agreed, that no good cause exists ...
The Doctrine of Equivalents can sometimes be an irritating aspect of patent law. Patent applicants tend to draft broad claims to begin with, and modern claim construction law likewise tends towards broad constructions. Once you add DOE on top, it can start to feel like the patent covers anything and everything.
But there is a boundary. Under the doctrine of "vitiation," courts have held that DOE can't be used to extend a claim to the oppose of what was claimed.
We got a good example of that this week from visiting judge Kennelly, who granted a motion for summary judgement of non-infringement after a seemingly fully-articulated DOE claim (DOE claims are often not-so-well articulated).
Yesterday, Judge Williams issued a claim construction opinion in Persawvere, Inc. v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, C.A. No. 21-400-GBW (D. Del. Feb. 21, 2023).
In the joint claim construction brief, plaintiff asserted that defendant had waived its indefiniteness arguments because it did not include them in its invalidity contentions:
Given that Defendant failed to raise an indefiniteness argument in its Invalidity Contentions concerning terms 3 and 4, see Ex. 8, Defendant has waived this defense.
D.I. 47 at 30. In the case, the scheduling order required both initial and final invalidity contentions; defendant did not mention indefiniteness in its initial contentions, and the deadline for final contentions had not yet passed.
It's fairly common for a patentee to bring suit simultaneously against both a customer who is using or reselling an infringing product and the manufacturer who produced the product.
Sometimes the customer is the real target, and sometimes it's the manufacturer. Either way, some courts have recognized a "customer suit exception" that suggests that, under some circumstances, suits against a manufacturer should take precedence over a suit against a customer.
As courts sometimes point out, the customer suit "exception" began as an exception to the first filed rule in patent cases. But courts can also apply the principle more broadly, including to motions to stay.
For example, last week Judge Williams addressed a motion to stay …
I was always disappointed when I became a lawyer that my day-to-day work did not involve more loopholes. You watch any TV show -- Law & Order (original or extra crispy (that's SVU)), The Good Wife, Matlock, all you hear is loophole this and loophole that. But every day I come into the office and its just the regular old law. It just seemed less clever than a loophole.
I didn't ask for him to be holding a cheeto, and I can't explain why he is #SnacknetAI-Generated, displayed with permission
I was thus borderline ecstatic to see Judge Burke deciding a discovery dispute over what seems to be a genuine loophole in a protective order.
The prosecution bar in FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. v. Roambee Corp., C.A. No. 21-175-CFC-CJB (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2023) had three distinct parts.
The first was a basic prosecution bar:
[P]ersons . . . who have received access to Designated Material, shall not be engaged . . . in prosecution of patent applications on behalf of the Receiving Party . . . claiming tracking devices used in systems that monitor shipments, without prior approval to do so from the Producing Party.
The second allowed persons otherwise covered by the bar to advise on subjects other than the drafting crafting or amending of claims before the ...
Even the dullest 1L can tell you that rule 12(b) sets the timing for motions to dismiss:
A motion asserting any of [the 12(b)] defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.
However, pursuant to 12(h), the defenses listed in 12(b)(2)-12(b)(5) are not actually waived as long as you include them as an affirmative defense in your answer (12(b)(1) and (b)(6) have separate rules).
A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by . . failing to either:(i) make it by motion under this rule; or include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course
So then, if these defenses aren't waived, when can you …
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.
