The District of Delaware sometimes requires the parties to file joint status reports, usually either at dates set in the scheduling order (e.g. an "interim status report") or following developments in the case that require more information, like a stipulated stay that has expired, or after a communication from the parties regarding a development in the case.
Typically, by convention, plaintiff handles the initial draft of these reports—but not always. Either way, one side will send a draft, and the other side will prove its position, sometimes reflexively opposing whatever is in the initial draft. The final report will often be split, with "Plaintiff's position" and "Defendant's position," although sometimes the parties will agree to a …
It is a live question in this District whether the filing of a complaint for infringement can support a claim - asserted in a later, amended complaint - for post-suit indirect infringement or post-suit willful infringement. Judge Burke recently offered some helpful comments on his views regarding this question, and at the same time, provided some guidance about how to allege pre-suit indirect infringement.
In an R&R issued February 7 in Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Tonal Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 21-652-LPS-CJB, Judge Burke addressed two separate questions. First, whether the amended complaint adequately pleaded pre-suit indirect and willful infringement, and second, whether it adequately pleaded post-suit indirect and willful infringement...
Judge Burke issued an R&R today on two things we don't see very often: a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings, and preemption of state law claims by federal patent law.
The case, Bear Box LLC v. Lancium LLC, C.A. No. 21-534-MN-CJB (D. Del.), involves a patent on more-energy-efficient cryptocurrency mining systems. One of the plaintiffs claims to have met one of the defendants at a conference and, later, confidentially disclosed his ideas for improved cryptocurrency mining. Then, he says, the defendants patented his ideas.
According to the Court, plaintiffs brought two correction-of-inventorship claims, plus three state law claims:
Conversion ("theft of inventions")
Unjust enrichment (claiming inventorship of plaintiff's invention) …
Last Thursday, Judge Burke issued an R&R on SJ in a patent action. The patent involved software for playing back audio, and the claims included means-plus-function claim elements where an action is triggered either by a single "Back" command or by two consecutive "Back" commands.
Defendant argued that the patent failed to disclose corresponding structure showing how to calculate whether the two button presses were "consecutive"—i.e., how to measure the time between clicks. Judge Burke agreed that the patent failed to disclose such a structure:
As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that these limitations "do not recite any functional requirement to measure time[.]" . . . As Defendant notes, . . . in order to be able …
The Delaware Default Standard for Discovery, discussed on these pages before, contains both patent- and non-patent-specific discovery rules and limits. Among them are a six-year limit on certain discovery in patent cases and a 10-custodian limit for electronic discovery. When the Default Standard is incorporated into the scheduling order (as it often is), its provisions are no longer guidelines or default provisions, but instead are requirements the parties must abide by, and which cannot be changed absent a showing of good cause.
Last week, Judge Burke resolved a number of discovery disputes in U.S. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., C.A. No. 19-2103-MN, using the Default Standard (incorporated by reference into Judge Noreika's scheduling order) to guide his analysis.
First, Judge Burke denied the government's request for documents regarding manufacturing costs and other factors considered by defendant Gilead in pricing decisions in 2004:
The Court's Default Standard for Discovery, Including Discovery of Electronically Stored Information ("ESI") (the "Default Standard") sets a presumption that discovery from six years or more before the case's filing will not be permitted. . . . Here, in the few sentences of argument on this point in its briefing, . . . the Government does not provide enough information to establish the requisite good cause. During the teleconference, the Government suggested that good cause was established because it was only in 2004, and at no time thereafter, that Defendants had extensive discussions relating to the factors contributing to Truvada pricing decisions. However, that assertion is merely attorney argument, as there is no record evidence before the Court supporting such a conclusion.
Judge Burke also limited document discovery regarding Board of Directors meetings where pricing or the patents-in-suit were discussed to six years prior to the complaint, but did permit some discovery on those topics within the six-year period. ...
Conventional components arranged in an unconventional way.Devilz, Unsplash
Judge Burke today denied a § 101 motion to dismiss relating to a patent with a single, lengthy claim related to a new type of system-on-a-chip (SOC) that eliminates redundant components by using multiple "media processing units."
The claim sets out the structure of the apparatus, including that the media processing units have certain features and functions:
1. An apparatus for processing data, comprising:
a plurality of media processing units, each . . . :
a multiplier . . . ;
an arithmetic unit . . . ;
an arithmetic logic unit . . . ; and
a bit manipulation unit . . . .
each of the plurality of media processors for performing at least one . . . operation comprising:
receiving . . . an instruction . . . ;
receiving . . . input/output data . . . ;
processing the data . . . ; and
providing at least one . . . result . . . .
Judge Burke found that the claims were not directed to the abstract idea ...
It's easy to forget that, before the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, attorney communications with testifying experts and drafts of expert reports were often discoverable by the other side.
The amended Federal Rules offer more protection to those kinds of materials. But since the change, some attorneys have become much more open in their communication with testifying experts, and some experts have become much less sensitive to avoiding written records.
But post-2010 Rule 26 does not protect everything relating to a testifying expert's work. In fact, it has gaping holes, and protects only two things: "drafts of any report or disclosure" and "communications between the party's attorney …
In a recent Daubert ruling, Judge Burke offered some helpful reminders regarding the threshold for expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702. In particular, Judge Burke's ruling highlights the principle that an expert's qualifications need not be supported by advanced degrees or decades of experience, if the other requirements of Rule 702 are met.
In 360Heroes, Inc. v. GoPro, Inc., 17-1302-LPS-CJB, a case in which Judge Burke has been assigned all pretrial matters, the plaintiff moved to exclude the defendant's expert Ryan Thomas, an Emmy-nominated video content creator. Mr. Thomas was retained by the defendant to offer opinions on products available to 360 video content creators from 2015 to the present, including commercially acceptable alternatives to the plaintiff's patented products.
The plaintiff sought to exclude Mr. Thomas' entire opinion, on two grounds - his qualifications and the reliability of his opinions - neither of which Judge Burke found persuasive.
First, the plaintiff asserted that Mr. Thomas was not qualified to serve as an expert under Rule 702 because...
Last week, in deciding a renewed motion to stay pending a § 101 motion to dismiss, Judge Burke commented on the likelihood of success of such motions:
The Court, having reviewed the parties' letters relating to Defendant's request to renew its motion to stay, . . . hereby ORDERS that the request is DENIED. . . . [I]n light of the circumstances here (including the statistical unlikelihood of prevailing on a Section 101 motion to dismiss as to each of the four separate patents−in−suit), the Court concludes a stay is not warranted.
Defendant had renewed the motion to stay after Judge Burke denied it in late April. That transcript was …
There was an interesting discovery dispute order from Judge Burke yesterday. In Sysmex Corporation et al v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., C.A. No. 19-642-RGA-CJB (D. Del.) (a case we've previously discussed), due to COVID issues, defendant has been unable to depose the inventor—an employee of plaintiff—since the deposition was noticed over eight months ago.
Now, fact discovery is closed, summary judgment motions are due today, and the case is scheduled for trial in February 2022—but the plaintiff still hasn't provided the inventor for a deposition.
The defendant wisely moved to stay the case pending deposition of the inventor. In ruling on the motion, ...
This blog is for general informational purposes. It is not an offer to perform legal services, and should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Nothing in this blog should be construed as forming an attorney-client relationship. If you have legal questions, please consult counsel in your jurisdiction.
