We posted earlier this year about Judge Connolly's new standing orders requiring plaintiffs to disclose litigation funding and Rule 7.1 disclosure requirements for certain entities such as LLCs.
In that post, we pointed out that "the language seems to apply to existing cases, but there is no explicit deadline for compliance. Personally, though, I'd probably get moving..."
Apparently, counsel for the parties in VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation, C.A. No. 18-966 (D. Del.) do not read the blog.
About two weeks ago, the Court issued oral orders in VLSI directing the parties to comply with his standing orders:
ORAL ORDER: It is HEREBY ORDERED that each party shall …
When expert reports go back and forth in a patent case, it's not uncommon to see complaints from the patentee's expert along the lines of "I understand that the opposing party did not produce information regarding x, so I will instead base my opinions y."
In other words, the expert wants to keep the door open to explain to the jury that he or she would have done a particular analysis if only the other side had given them the information they needed. But, obviously, the other side may object to that testimony.
Judge Connolly addressed a situation like yesterday, and held that the expert cannot just testify to the jury about the other sides alleged …
Just a heads up, since this has to be one of the more common things that counsel do in cases—this week, Judge Connolly denied a stipulation extending the answer deadline as untimely and lacking a reason:
ORAL ORDER: The parties' stipulation (D.I. 16) being untimely and offering no justification for an extension, it is HEREBY DENIED. Defendant has until June 23, 2022 to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint. ORDERED by Judge Colm F. Connolly on 6/21/22. (ntl) (Entered: 06/21/2022)
Wikeshire IP LLC v. TransCore, LP, C.A. No. 22-445-VAC (D. Del.).
It's not clear from the docket why it was untimely. It looks like the answer deadline was originally 4/28/2022, then it was extended by stip to 5/28, then 6/14. Then, on 6/14 (the due date), the parties filed another stipulation extending the answer deadline to 6/28.
So it looks like the Court rejected a stipulation filed on 6/14 to extend a 6/14 due date. It may be that the parties filed after the 6pm filing deadline. Or, it may be that the Court is taking the view that the stipulation must be filed early enough for the Court to "so order" it prior to the deadline—but I haven't seen that in other cases.
Either way, it's probably safest to list a justification for your stip extending the answer deadline, and to file early going forward! Of course, this can be tricky in high-volume NPE cases, where plaintiff's counsel may be unresponsive until the parties are right up against a deadline.
Last month, we wrote about Chief Judge Connolly's new standing order for diversity cases, requiring plaintiffs to disclose the citizenship of LLCs on both sides so that the Court can determine whether it has diversity jurisdiction.
Today, Judge Connolly denied a motion to alter or amend a judgment in a diversity action where he had issued a similar order and dismissed the case based on the Plaintiff's own "on information and belief" representation.
In Harbor Associates Limited Partnership v. Micron Devices, LLC, C.A. No. 20-1706-CFC (D. Del.), the Court sua sponte issued an order asking for plaintiffs to identify their members and those of one of the defendants, to ensure that the Court had diversity jurisdiction:
To ensure that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, Plaintiffs . . . shall within one week identify the name and citizenship of every member of [a plaintiff LLC], and [defendant] Micron Devices, LLC. If any of [the two LLCs'] members are noncorporate entities, Plaintiffs shall also identity the name and citizenship of every member of those entities, proceeding up the chain of ownership until Plaintiffs have identified the name and citizenship of every individual and corporation with a direct or indirect interest in [the LLCs].
D.I. 24. In response, the plaintiffs identified themselves as Florida entities, D.I. 25, and stated on information and believe that one member of one defendant LLC was also a Florida citizen:
Upon information and belief, Laura Perryman is a member of [defendant] Micron Devices, LLC. . . . Upon information and belief, Ms. Perryman is a citizen of Florida.
D.I. 26. In response, the Court dismissed the case, holding that it lacked jurisdiction:
Consistent with their complaint, Plaintiffs identified Florida as the citizenship of the members of the plaintiff entities. D.I. 25. They also identified Laura Perryman as a member of Defendant Micron Devices, LLC and they say that she too is a citizen of Florida. D.I. 26. This Court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction over this action.
D.I. 26, 27.
Can We Just . . . Click Undo on That?
Apparently not realizing what was about to happen when they made those statements to the Court, plaintiffs quickly moved for relief ...
On Friday, Chief Judge Connolly issued an order in the lead-up to an ANDA bench trial compelling the plaintiff to reduce its number of asserted claims by 75% to 4 claims, or face consequences:
ORAL ORDER: WHEREAS, the parties filed the proposed pretrial order (D.I. 225) on May 10, 2022; WHEREAS, the bench trial in this case is 24 days away, and, according to the pretrial order, Plaintiffs are still asserting 15 claims across eight patents . . . ; and WHEREAS, Plaintiffs' assertion of 15 claims across eight patents at this juncture makes clear that Plaintiffs have yet to focus adequately on the relative strength of their various infringement claims, the limited resources of …
A requirement to disclose third-party litigation funding arrangements on the docket;
A requirement in diversity cases to disclose the name and citizenship of every individual and corporation with a direct or indirect interest in every party;
An order expanding disclosure requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 for non-governmental joint ventures, LLCs, partnerships, and LLPs;
A requirement for the defendant in ANDA cases where there was a Paragraph IV certification to produce the ANDA when responding to the complaint;
The above are numbered only for reference below.
Each of these orders explicitly applies only in Chief Judge Connolly cases.
Bifurcation into liability and damages phases used to be common, with former Judge Robinson often splitting liability and damages, at one point saying that “bifurcation is appropriate, if not necessary, in all but exceptional patent cases.” Dutch Branch of Streamserve Dev. AB v. Exstream Software, LLC, C.A. No. 08-343-SLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76006, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2009).
Earlier this month, though, Chief Judge Connolly raised bifurcation in a way I hadn't heard of, suggesting that the parties split infringement from invalidity and other issues, with jury deliberations in between:
As frequent readers of this blog already know, somejudges in Delaware have limited parties to a total of 10 terms for construction across all asserted patents.
We've noted at least one previous instance where Chief Judge Connolly seemed to limit the parties to 10 claim construction disputes. Last week, the Court made an even clearer statement on the issue.
The parties in MG FreeSites Ltd v. ScorpCast, LLC, C.A. No. 20-1012-CFC-JLH (D. Del.) filed their joint claim chart in advance of claim construction, and listed 15 terms in dispute. They also included a footnote smartly noting Chief Judge Connolly's practice not to permit argument on indefiniteness at the claim construction stage.
If you only occasionally practice in the district, you might be unaware of an old standing order on the procedure for objecting to R&R's. The unimaginatively titled "October 9, 2013 Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72" contains requirements for filing objections that do not appear in either the local rules or FRCP 72.
Most of these requirements are simple logistical matters -- the length and timing of briefs, requiring courtesy copies, etc. A recent ruling from Judge Connolly, however, shows the imprtance of following these requirements precisely.
The defendant in In Personal Audio LLC v. Google LLC, C.A. No. 17-1751-CFC-CJB, D.I. 715 (D. Del. Jan 21, 2022) had lost a …
There are certain situations that come up over and over in patent cases. One of them is that a plaintiff will bring identical infringement suits against multiple defendants, and one of those defendants will then file an IPR or CBM proceeding before the patent office attacking the validity of the patents.
Under the America Invents Act, the filing party and any real party in interest are subject to estoppel. But unrelated defendants are not. The filing party will often move to stay the district court litigation. Generally speaking, parties with an instituted IPR or CBM review of all patents-in-suit often have pretty good chances of getting a stay.
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