A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: Motion to Dismiss

It's clear who was the faster draw.
It's clear who was the faster draw. AI-Generated

In Candid Care Co., v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, C.A. No. 21-1180-CFC (D. Del.), SmileDirectClub sued Candid Care—its competitor—for patent infringement of a single patent. Chief Judge Connolly dismissed the case, holding that the patent was patent ineligible under § 101.

The next day, SmileDirectClub sued Candid Care on a second patent in the same family, this time in the Western District of Texas.

But the Western District of Texas transferred the case back to Delaware—and, because it is related to the previous case, it was assigned to Chief Judge Connolly again. Shortly thereafter (perhaps to avoid its second patent suffering a similar fate under § 101), SmileDirectClub granted …

Visualization of pendent venue
Visualization of pendent venue Chris Linnett, Unsplash

Today Chief Judge Connolly addressed a motion to dismiss a combined trade dress, federal unfair competition, copyright infringement, and design patent infringement action.

The parties apparently agreed that the defendant in the action did not meet the TC Heartland venue test for the patent portion of the action:

Argento is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York. . . . It is undisputed that Argento does not own, rent, or maintain any offices, physical property, addresses, or bank accounts in Delaware and does not employ any Delaware-based employees, agents, or representatives. It is also undisputed that venue of Globefill's patent claim against Argento does not lie …

Even the dullest 1L can tell you that rule 12(b) sets the timing for motions to dismiss:

A motion asserting any of [the 12(b)] defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.

However, pursuant to 12(h), the defenses listed in 12(b)(2)-12(b)(5) are not actually waived as long as you include them as an affirmative defense in your answer (12(b)(1) and (b)(6) have separate rules).

A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by . . failing to either:(i) make it by motion under this rule; or include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course

So then, if these defenses aren't waived, when can you …

An AI-generated (!!) scene of a split courthouse
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

We've written a lot about how there is a split in the District of Delaware about whether a complaint itself can establish knowledge of infringement sufficient to support a claim of post-filing willfulness or induced infringement.

Early this week, visiting Judge Kennelly weighed in, siding with the judges who say that a complaint can establish knowledge, in a short opinion:

A claim for willful infringement of a patent requires the plaintiff to establish—or at this point in the case, to plausibly allege—that the accused infringer had knowledge of or was willfully blind to the patent and that its conduct constituted, induced, or contributed to infringement. . . . Similarly, a claim of induced or contributory infringement …

Federal Circuit on the left vs. Federal Circuit on the right. Will we get to see round 2?
Federal Circuit on the left vs. Federal Circuit on the right. Will we get to see round 2? Charl Folscher, Unsplash

We talked a couple of days ago about how, in Longbeam Technologies LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1559-CFC (D. Del.), Chief Judge Connolly stayed the action after raising plaintiff's inadequate disclosures at a § 101 hearing.

But, at the same hearing, plaintiff actually prevailed on the § 101 motion—and Chief Judge Connolly made some notable comments about how the Federal Circuit has responded to his previous § 101 decisions, and what that means for cases going forward.

Case 1, Universal Secure: Affirmed

The first case, Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., …

Hand Washing
Tim Mossholder, Unsplash

In an opinion on Friday, visiting Judge Stephanos Bibas of the Third Circuit pointed out a split in District of Delaware cases regarding whether a party can bring unclean hands counterclaims in patent cases:

Nor does TexasLDPC persuade me this declaratory-judgment counterclaim fails as a matter of law. True, courts disagree whether “unclean hands” can support a declaration that a patent is unenforceable. Compare In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348 (D.N.J. 2009) (concluding it cannot), and Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. Cardinal Health 200, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104983, at *2–3 (D. Del. Jul. 27, 2012) (same),[ ]with The Meds. Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 2011 WL 13141923, at *1 n.2 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss or strike unclean hands counterclaim).

Judge Bibas sided with the cases holding that "unclean hands" is a proper counterclaim in a patent action:

Still, I will not stop Defendants from demanding a declaratory judgment about the unclean-hands doctrine. In my view, I may grant such relief. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1025–26 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] district court ...

Apples at which the patentee will not be getting a third bite.
Apples at which the patentee will not be getting a third bite. Pierpaolo Riondato, Unsplash

Back in February, Judge Andrews granted a motion to dismiss a patent with claims directed to the abstract ideas of "the recording, storing, delivering, and deleting of media content on a mobile device," and "remote control" of a mobile device. Clear Doc, Inc. v. RiversideFM, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1422-RGA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31168, at *15 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2022).

He dismissed the claims on § 101 grounds, but granted leave to amend on the theory that the patentee could show an inventive concept:

Riverside's motion to dismiss is granted. Dismissal is without prejudice. OpenReel has requested leave to amend. (D.I. 46 at 19 n.1). I will grant that request, as it is possible OpenReel could successfully amend its complaint.

Clear Doc, Inc. v. RiversideFM, Inc., Civil Action No. 21-1422-RGA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31168, at *15 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2022)

Id. at 19.

Taking the Court up on its offer, plaintiff amended their complaint to allege that certain feature constituted "inventive functions" under Alice—but the Court wasn't buying it:

The FAC has not alleged facts supporting the conclusion that the claims contain an unconventional technological solution as opposed to an abstract idea ...

setyaki-irham-tfdff8Poebw-unsplash
Setyaki Irham, Unsplash

I was talking to my fellow blogger Andrew the other day, when we had the following exchange:

Andrew: Greetings treasured friend and colleague! Have you noticed that Judge Andrews hasn't been requiring parties to submit scheduling orders whilst motions to dismiss are pending?

Me: Truly?

Andrew: Indubitably, I would not jest on such a matter! I have, in fact, just confirmed it by reviewing his 10 most recent orders on motions to dismiss with my own eyes.

Me: Well I cannot gainsay such thorough research. But what of the others? Do Judges Noreika and Connolly decide motions to dismiss before requiring the parties to submit a proposed schedule?

Andrew: I'm certain I don't know, but certainly …