A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for tag: IPR

Previous equations for deciding whether to join an existing IPR
Previous equations for deciding whether to join an existing IPR Roman Mager, Unsplash

Today the Federal Circuit held that a party joining an existing IPR is not subject to estoppel on any grounds other than those that were actually raised. See the opinion below.

Before this, a plaintiff could argue that a defendant who joined an in-progress IPR was estopped on any anticipation or obviousness arguments that "reasonably could have [been] raised" in the IPR.

The Court here held, in short, that because a defendant joining an existing IPR is not allowed to add new grounds at all, it cannot be estopped except on those grounds actually raised.

It relied on the Facebook decision we talked about …

IPR

The Federal Circuit's decision is below.

It found that even though the defendant did not receive an identification of asserted claims from the plaintiff until after the statutory IPR deadline, and even though the patents included a total of 830 claims, the statute did not allow the defendant to file a new IPR petition and then join it to its previous IPR proceeding as a way to add claims after the statutory filing deadline.

The Court recognized that the decision would result in wasted efforts by defendants in challenging claims unnecessarily:

We . . . recognize that our analysis here may lead defendants, in some circumstances, to expend effort and expense in challenging claims that may ultimately never be asserted …

While pre-institution stays pending IPR are usually seen as disfavored in this District, they are occasionally granted. The circumstances must be right, however.

Judge Connolly recently ordered a stay in Allergan USA, Inc. v. Prollenium US Inc., C.A. No. 20-0104-CFC pending IPRs that had been filed—but not instituted—on all asserted claims.

He noted that a related action had already been stayed pending IPR, and that the defendants had agreed "to forgo their inequitable conduct counterclaims and defenses in both actions," and found good cause to stay. As a condition of the stay, he required that defendants dismiss their inequitable conduct defenses and counterclaims, and ordered that they would be "barred" from pursuing those defenses in both actions...