Judge Bryson unsealed a discovery dispute opinion last week in Impossible Foods Inc. v. Motif Foodworks, Inc., C.A. No. 22-311-WCB (D. Del.), addressing a motion to supplement infringement contentions after the deadline for final contentions. The patentee argued that it had good cause to supplement because it did so quickly after the accused infringer added a totally new prior art reference in their final invalidity contentions.
There are a couple of interesting things about the opinion, but I wanted to call out one in particular.
The case included a deadlines for final contentions, and then for case narrowing, with the defendant to drop to a list of 10 references. The defendant initially cut …
Chief Judge Connolly issued an opinion today addressing whether a claim to a COVID "vaccine" can extend to something that is not a "vaccine," and ultimately calling for the Federal Circuit to address its inconsistent precedent on construction of patent claim preambles.
The claims at issue claimed "[a] vaccine comprising . . ." a certain formulation. They agreed on what a vaccine is, but disagreed as to whether that term in the preamble to the claims should be limiting:
What the parties dispute is whether the term "vaccine" is "limiting" in claims 27 and 28. "Limiting" is patent-speak for "is an element of the claim." . . . Notwithstanding the fact that claim 27 …
I couldn't find a picture for this. Just imagine each leaf is an individual claim construction oral order.Erol Ahmed, Unsplash
I've noticed that, since November of last year, Judge Burke has been issuing claim construction opinions in some cases in the form of a series of oral orders on the docket, rather than a formal memorandum opinion or an order with footnotes. I thought I'd flag this so that people know what may happen if you have claim construction in a case before Judge Burke.
I first saw the Court construe terms via oral orders on the docket in November 2023, in The Nielsen Company (US), LLC v. TVision Insights, Inc., C.A. No. 22-057, D.I. 140-141 ( …
(Eds. Note - Andrew actually knows how the website works, so he could probably stop me)
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Today's case is RyanAir DAC v. Booking Holdings Inc., C.A. No. 20-1191-WCB, D.I. 399 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2024). For those unfamiliar, RyanAir is sort of the Irish version of Spirit airlines, although I believe they represent a significantly less wintry ring of hell (I understand they do not charge extra for a seat that did not previously contain an incontinent cat). Booking is a third-party website for booking airfare and accommodations -- similar to Expedia for our American readers.
Apparently, it was undisputed that Booking paid contractors to scrub RyanAir's website via screengrabs to get prices to post on their site. RyanAir sued, alleging that this amounted to a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") because, in collecting the screencaps, Booking and its contractors "intentionally accessed a computer without authorization or exceeded authorized access, and thereby obtained information from any protected computer."
So I mean, its pretty close to IP.
The issue was that RyanAir's website was, unsurprisingly, open to the flying public. They ran various anti-spyware measures to prevent bots from scrubbing their website for prices and blacklisted known bots, but any normal person was free to peruse at their leisure. The dispute thus centered on whether running bots to grab the prices, in contravention of terms of service and in an active attempt to circumvent the security measures, constituted access to the website "without authorization." Judge Bryson found that ...
It can be risky to stipulate to change the deadline for dispositive motions, particularly for the reply brief, because it cuts short the Court's time to resolve those motions.
We've talked about this before, including in our guide to stipulations. But I think it's worth noting again, given that it popped up twice within the past week.
In both instances, the parties stipulated to move the reply dispositive motion deadline, while keeping the pretrial conference deadline—thus shortening the Court's time to resolve case dispositive and Daubert motions.
Likewise in both instances, the Court said no, but gave the parties some options.
As to the first stip, Magistrate Judge Burke actually suggested an abbreviated summary …
Alice ponders the internet of thingsAI-Generated, displayed with permission
Last week in Ignite Enterprise Software Solutions, LLC et al. v. NGData, US Inc. and NGData N.V., C.A. 23-1209 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2024), Judge Murphy dinged defendants for stale citations, including failing to cite recent Federal Circuit precedent on the level of detail required in patent pleadings.
We flagged the case that this Court called the "most recent and most relevant Federal Circuit authority" back when it came out: Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., C.A. No. 2020-2218, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20624 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021).
Analysis of Every Claim is Not Required in the Complaint
"By careful review of literally just the face of the patent, we have determined that the conception date is no later than the 2/3/2017 filing date. You're welcome."AI-Generated, displayed with permission
I admit, sometimes I write about things because I want to be able to find them next time I need them. This is one of those posts.
As we've discussed before, most patent cases involve an interrogatory to the patentee asking for the date of conception. Patentees often give a low-effort initial response along the lines of "no later than x," where x is the date of filing or some other easy-to-identify date. Then they wait to see whether they need an earlier date, and supplement if so.
This has two benefits for the patentee: (1) it makes it hard for the accused infringer to weigh the relative merits of the prior art, because it has to hit a moving target, and (2) it's super easy, because the patentee doesn't have to review any of the materials. Thus, it's a common response.
The Court has rejected this response in the past, including the idea that "[a patentee] has no obligation to investigate whether the patent-in-suit is entitled to an earlier priority date at least until Defendant has provided its invalidity contentions." The Court in that transcript forced the patentee to actually respond to the interrogatory—making it a handy transcript for accused infringers.
There's a patent trial starting on Monday in Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Finch Therapeutics Group, Inc., C.A. No. 21-1694-JLH (D. Del.), and filings are flying back and forth across the docket this week. The Court's order on motions in limine included this line, which piqued my interest:
To say that the Court is troubled by the occurrences to date would be an extreme understatement.
What was so troubling? It's tough to decipher exactly what is going on from the docket, which is fragmented and redacted. But it has to do with the parties' actions related to an inventor of certain of the asserted patents.
Behold, our claim chart. Look upon it and despair!AI-Generated, displayed with permission
Parties in patent cases often fight about the sufficiency of infringement and invalidity contentions. Parties may offer broad initial contentions, keeping their options open as the case develops and avoiding the cost of detailed contentions. The opposing party, though, may want detailed contentions to narrow and explain the case and to tie parties to their positions.
Often, one side or the other moves to compel more detailed contentions knowing that, if they lose and if the opposing party refuses to supplement, they will be better positioned to exclude the more detailed contentions inevitably offered later.
The defendant in Almondnet, Inc. v. Viant Technology LLC, C.A. No. …
Sometimes you see a group of patents, and you just know there's a story there. The first patent will be something benign like an "apparatus for getting to stuff stuck in the back of the drawer." Then, a few years later, there's a new patent from the same inventors for "an apparatus for catching the very large spiders that are sometimes also in the back of the drawer." Some time later, their heirs will file a patent for "a system for automatically extinguishing the towering inferno resulting from the SRS (Spider Retention System)."
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This brings us to last week's opinion in Evonik Ops. GmbH v. Air Prods. and Chem., Inc., C.A. No. 22-1543-JPM, D.I. 58 (D. Del. July 24, 2024). The first patent there was an elaborate system for separating gases in a mixture. One of those stages required a specific gas stream to account for less than 60% of the total stream by volume. Then, years later, they were granted a near-identical patent on a system for separating gases where that same stream had to account for more than 60% of the total volume.
The defendants moved to dismiss the direct infringement claims as to one of the patents, arguing that the system, by definition, could only infringe one or the other (i.e., the gas could either be more or less than 60%, not both).
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