Judge Bryson issued an opinion today in Michael R. Cahill, Trustee of the Hunt Irrevocable Trust v. Air Medical Group Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 21-679-WCB (D. Del. Oct. 16, 2023). In it, he describes a clever procedural maneuver that failed, but resulted in a positive outcome anyway.
The case involves an breach of contract claim affirmative claim and counter-claim. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on their affirmative claim, holding that it was time-barred under a provision of the contract that set out a time for bringing claims.
The defendant then seemed to realize: if our counterclaim is time barred, then their affirmative claim is time-barred too. But the case dispositive motions deadline had already passed. What to do?
The defendant decided to file an FRCP 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. These motions can be filed, according to the rule, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial."
Defendant moved for judgment that plaintiff's claim was time barred just like defendant's counterclaim was.
The Court recognized what defendant was trying to do—but considered the motion anyway:
Although denominated a motion to dismiss, Air Medical’s motion appears to be more properly characterized as a second motion for summary judgment or an untimely motion for reconsideration. For reasons explained below, however, I do not regard the characterization of the motion as disqualifying and have therefore addressed the merits of the motion.
Id. at 1.
Judge Bryson went on to agree that the time bar would apply to both sides, if it applied at all. But he instead held that his previous order was mistaken, and the time bar doesn't apply at all—thereby undoing summary judgment and resurrecting Defendant's counterclaim:
Air Medical’s argument points out a flaw in the analysis of Air Medical’s counterclaim in my earlier summary judgment order. In particular, at pages 15–16 of that order, I ruled that any indemnification claim by Air Medical would be time-barred under section 9.01 of the Agreement. However, Air Medical’s request for indemnification would appear to be parallel to Hunt’s claim for breach; that is, if Hunt’s claim for breach is not barred by the 18-[month survival date in the Indemnification article, then neither is Air Medical’s, since the time limitations on asserting both claims are governed by the same provisions of Article IX of the Agreement. Therefore, because I have held that the 18-month limitations period does not apply to Hunt’s “Retained Property” claim, it follows that the 18-month limitations period also does not apply to Air Medical’s “Retained Liabilities” claim. For that reason, I will vacate my prior ruling granting Hunt’s motion for summary judgment on Air Medical’s indemnification claim for the attorney fees and costs associated with the negligence action, which was based on untimeliness.
Id. at 8.
Success! I guess? I'm sure they would rather have killed the affirmative claim.
Plaintiff raised a few procedural objections to this, but the Court shot them down. They first argued that the motion was a late motion for reconsideration:
Hunt argues that Air Medical’s motion is in essence a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order on summary judgment, and as such is out of time. While it is true that Air Medical’s motion challenges the court’s rationale in its summary judgment order, the thrust of the motion is directed to explaining that if Air Medical’s request for indemnification for its fees and costs in connection with the negligence litigation against a third party is untimely, then so is Hunt’s theory for recovery of the insurance proceeds. Because I have concluded that there is force to Air Medical’s argument that the two theories stand similarly with regard to the 18-month limitation argument, it would be unreasonable to reach different conclusions with regard to the limitations analysis of the two claims. Accordingly, while it would have been preferable for Air Medical to make its current arguments promptly, in a motion for reconsideration within 14 days of the issuance of the court’s summary judgment order, rather than waiting to file its motion for more than five weeks after the summary judgment order was entered, I will not deny the motion on the ground that it is in substance an untimely motion for reconsideration.
The Court also shot down a "law of the case" argument (holding he can reverse his own decision), and a prejudice argument (noting that the counterclaim was in the case until the SJ ruling, and trial is still 4 weeks away).
Are Rule 12(c) Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings "Dispositive Motions," or What?
The plaintiff here does not seem to have argued that the FRCP 12(c) motion was late because it is a "dispositive" motion, and subject to the same deadline for "case dispositive motions" as the original SJ motions were.
That's kind of a shame, because I've seen this argument come up occasionally, and I'm not sure there is much precedent on it (although feel free to correct me).
If FRCP 12(c) motions are dispositive, and not subject to the LR 7.1.1 meet-and-confer requirement, then should they be due by the "dispositive motions" deadline? And should the pages used for a 12(c) motion come out of the parties' SJ briefs? Just something to think about.
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