A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for date: May 2023

A few weeks ago, Andrew wrote a post on a case where Judge Connolly denied objections to a magistrate's order for failing to identify the standard of review. Well, don't call it a comeback, but it happened again, this time in a case before Judge Andrews.

DALL·E 2023-05-04 21.04.32 - 3d render of a judge break dancing
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

The objection in question actually failed under the rules on two counts—both failing to cite the relevant standard of review, and failing to include the certification that new arguments were not being raised. Judge Andrews found both failures fatal:

The first question on review is, what is the standard of review? The Local Rules recognize this: "Objections . . . shall identify the appropriate standard of review." I note that requiring the statement of a standard of review is helpful to the reviewing court. It might also help the disappointed party to consider whether it should even file objections. Barry does not identify a standard of review. . . . Barry did not comply with the Standing Order. His objections are thus overruled. I need proceed no further. . .
The Court has a standing order that states: "Any party filing objections . . . must include . . . a written statement either certifying that the objections do not raise new legal/factual arguments, or identifying the new arguments and describing the good cause for failing to previously raise [them] before the Magistrate Judge." Barry did not file such a written statement with his objections. Seaspine pointed this out. . . . Seaspine asserts that Barry has raised arguments that he did not raise before the Magistrate Judge. Had Barry filed the required statement, I would know what his position on Seaspine's assertion is. Even after Seaspine raised the issue, Barry did not seek leave to file a statement providing the required information. This is not some arcane requirement. It is a practical one, designed to make referrals to magistrate judges as efficient as the referral system can be. Barry' s objections are thus overruled. I need proceed no further

Barry v. Stryker Corporation, C.A. No. 20-1787-RGA (D. Del. May 4, 2023) (Mem. Order)

At this time, the bloggers code of ethics requires me to call this a trend. Stay safe out there.

Money: Something defendants probably won't be seeing here.
Money: Something defendants probably won't be seeing here. Giorgio Trovato, Unsplash

We've talked before about the Court's decision to award fees against Blackbird Tech LLC, based on Blackbird's "objectively baseless post-Markman litigation strategy."

Back in August, the Court ordered the parties to submit a stipulated fee amount, or for the defendant to submit a fee accounting. Since then, Defendant submitted a fee accounting showing $485,420.74 in fees, consisting of $404,734.68 for lead counsel and $80,686.06 for local counsel. Blackbird filed a very short statement opposing the fees amount.

The substance of Blackbird's statement is entirely redacted, but we can tell from the Court's order that they basically just argued that they are out of business:

Blackbird responded [to the fee accounting] with a "Statement" containing less than a page of text. (D.I. 275). Blackbird says it is out of business, has no assets, and is winding up under Massachusetts law.

M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless America Inc., C.A. No. 14-1102-RGA, D.I. 279 at 1 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2023).

The Court held that the fact that Blackbird is out of business has no impact on the fee award amount, but noted the (very, very likely) difficulty of collecting on fees:

That may all be true, but that does not state any reasons why I should not make the award. It merely suggests that collecting on the award may be difficult to impossible.

Id.

Redactions Strike Again

If you are someone who frequently files fee declarations after winning fee motions, you probably know that it can be tricky to support the reasonableness of fee requests. Most firms keep their rates ...

It's no secret that the Court is busy, and it's only getting busier. Time being such a limited resource, requests for special (expedited) treatment are particularly fraught.

AI-Generated, displayed with permission

An important codicil (legal words for 200 Alex (#notmyAlex)) to this rule is that, once you receive this special treatment, you really can't change your mind. This rule was brought into sparkling clarity in Taiho Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Eugia Pharma Specialities Ltd., C.A. No. 19-2309-CFC (D. Del. May 1, 2023) (Oral Order), which really speaks for itself:

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to extend by two weeks the deadline for their posttrial brief and findings of fact. During these proceedings, both sides insisted on quickly proceeding to a bench trial on the validity of the '284 patent, even though that patent does not expire until 2029. The Court accommodated the parties' request, and it has repeatedly noted the importance of the parties adhering to the Court's schedule given the Court's high caseload. Plaintiffs now seek to extend their posttrial briefing schedule by an additional two weeks because they have chosen to hire additional counsel. Plaintiffs have significantly burdened the Court's resources to date and proceeded to trial knowing that they had to abide by the Courts post trial schedule. Now therefore, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.

So there you go—if you're going to go fast, go fast.

The Mavexar crab is starting to sweat.
The Mavexar crab is starting to sweat. AI-Generated

It looks like activity is picking up again in the Mavexar cases. If you haven't followed all of our coverage so far (I don't blame you!), here is a summary of where we left off.

Today, Chief Judge Connolly issued an order denying a Mavexar entity's motions to set aside or stay compliance with the Court's March order requiring them to produce various documents, including potentially privileged documents.

He found that Supreme Court precedent shows that the District Court retains jurisdiction regarding collateral issues—like this one—even after a dismissal. According to the Court, that remains true regardless of whether the issues are raised by the parties or by the Court itself (as …

Abacus
Sami, CC BY 2.0

There was an interesting oral order from Judge Burke last week in Natera, Inc. v. CareDX, Inc., C.A. No. 20-38 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2023). Defendant apparently asserted a large number of § 112 defenses based on lack of enablement or written description. The Court held that the defendant had to narrow it's defenses.

The parties further disputed whether the parties should count § 112 arguments by limitation or by claim. The Court held that they should be counted by claim limitation, not by claim:

With respect to the parties' dispute as to whether an argument that a claim is invalid under section 112 based on a particular claim limitation counts …