We posted last month about two more mandamus petitions regarding Chief Judge Connolly's recent efforts to enforce his standing orders regarding disclosure requirements in his cases.
The Mavexar saga is getting a bit complicated, so here is a quick recap of the mandamus petitions:
- Chief Judge Connolly scheduled hearings in several cases regarding various plaintiffs' compliance with his standing orders
- In two of the hearings, the plaintiffs explained that an entity called Mavexar recruited the plaintiffs and took up to 95% of their proceeds
- The Court ordered some of the Mavexar entities to produce a broad range of communications among the plaintiffs, Mavexar, and their attorneys
- One of those entities, Nimitz, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the communications are irrelevant and privileged
- The Federal Circuit stayed the lower court's pursuit of the documents, but ultimately denied the petition after Chief Judge Connolly issued a 78-page defense of his order
- While the first petition was pending, two of the other plaintiffs filed a second round of mandamus petitions, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the cases had been dismissed, and challenging Chief Judge Connolly's standing orders regarding disclosures
Today, the Federal Circuit issued orders denying the second round of mandamus petitions. It rejected both of the plaintiffs' arguments as premature. First, it said, the Court has not yet found that the plaintiffs violated its disclosure order (remember: in these cases, the Court only scheduled a hearing):
Creekview argues that the district court clearly overstepped its authority when it entered the standing orders. But a direct challenge to those orders at this juncture is premature, as Creekview has not been found to violate those orders, and it will have alternative adequate means to raise such challenges if, and when, such violations are found to occur.
The Federal Circuit rejected the second argument because plaintiff had failed to raise it below as well:
[T]he petition is premature. Given that the district court has taken no further action in these cases since its September 12 order, other than to grant Creekview’s motion for a stay, the court has not addressed Creekview’s argument that in light of the notice of voluntary dismissal and stipulation of dismissal the court may not conduct the proposed inquiry into the accuracy of Creekview’s corporate disclosure statements and compliance with the court’s standing order on third-party litigation funding. Creekview’s contention that the district court may not continue its inquiry following the dismissals and that mandamus should be granted on that ground is therefore premature.
The Federal Circuit could have stopped there—having found that the petition was premature—but it continued, giving guidance to the plaintiffs that they are unlikely to prevail on their argument that the dismissal deprived the Court of jurisdiction:
Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal. Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to regulate practice before it). Creekview has not shown that the court has taken any action in this case that is so far outside its authority to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus.
That result isn't exactly surprising. Courts regularly handle matters after a voluntary or stipulated dismissal including, for example, motions for attorneys' fees. But it's still nice to see what the Federal Circuit is thinking here.
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