Last week, Judge Andrews granted a motion for reargument in a products liability diversity action, permitting further argument on summary judgment after the Court had previously ended the case by finding against plaintiff at summary judgment.
In its original opinion, nearly a year ago, the Court found that a federal statute that limits products liability for aircraft parts manufacturers blocked recovery here, and entered a judgment for defendant on all claims.
Plaintiff's motion for reargument asserted that, in addition to bringing actions against defendant as a "manufacturer," it had asserted claims based on the defendant's role as a "rebuilder and seller" of airline parts, and then detailed an argument based on the statutory language, legislative history, and policy for why the Court's opinion was wrong.
The Court rejected most of plaintiff's arguments, but it took note that the plaintiff had asserted some form of separate claims against the defendant as a "rebuilder and seller" of airline parts—claims that the parties had not addressed but that were nonetheless swept up in the judgment:
[A]part from identifying Continental as the manufacturer of the [product at issue], the Court's opinion did not expressly address whether Continental was being sued . . . in its capacity as a manufacturer. Further, the opinion noted that "the manufacturer, while not liable as the manufacturer, and, for example, not liable for defective design, would still face liability for negligence [for a rebuilt part] akin to what an overhauler would face, that is, for example, liability for negligent workmanship." . . . The opinion did not address Plaintiffs' statement that claims existed against Continental separately in its capacity as the seller and re builder of the magneto. . . . While I disagree with Plaintiffs' characterization of the Court's error, the possibility that summary judgment was granted on claims neither fully briefed nor argued is sufficient to warrant a grant of reargument.
The Court therefore ordered additional briefing to avoid "manifest injustice":
For the reasons set for above, Plaintiffs' motion for reargument . . . is GRANTED. The previous order . . . is VACATED in part as to the portions of Count Five that are alleged against Continental as a rebuilder and a seller. The parties should understand that I am not deciding anything in Plaintiffs' favor by this ruling. I am merely acknowledging that I did not consider certain arguments (which were sketchily set forth at best), and that I think it would work a manifest injustice on Plaintiffs if I did not fully consider them. The parties should consult and agree to a briefing schedule (with Plaintiffs going first). Any argument that Plaintiffs could make that is not fulsomely set forth in the opening brief will be considered to have been waived.
It's always interesting to see the kinds of things that work (and don't work) in a motion for reargument. Here, the Court actually rejected the substance of plaintiff's argument, but their motion nonetheless called the Court's attention to the fact that the judgment may have swept up more claims than the Court intended. That was enough to at least get them more briefing.
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