A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Entries for date: 2020

I'm not sure that these are actually Georgia peaches.
I'm not sure that these are actually Georgia peaches. Joanna Stołowicz, Unsplash

Judge Noreika granted a motion to transfer yesterday in a case against an Equifax entity, where 3 of the Third Circuit's Jumara factors favored transfer, and only one (plaintiff's choice of forum) weighed against.

My first thought was—Did the plaintiff really have only one factor in it's favor?

Judge Noreika usually credits the fact that the Defendant is a Delaware corporation, and I thought Equifax was one.

Turns out, so did plaintiff. The complaint lists the defendant as a Delaware corporation. But—as the Court notes—Equifax Information Services is actually a Georgia entity. Plaintiff messed up.

So the transfer makes sense. The plaintiff is Hawaiian, meaning …

"Plain and ordinary meaning" has a mixed record as a claim construction position. Despite the fact that the claim language itself is the heart of claim construction, litigants and judges may feel pressure to define claim language that is already reasonably clear, especially if there is a dispute tied to that language. In fact, judges in this District have expressly discouraged litigants from advancing "plain and ordinary meaning" as a proposed construction during the Markman process.

However, there is no reason that the language of the claim itself - if sufficiently clear - cannot stand on its own, even if there is a dispute. The challenge (and burden) for the Court lies in sorting through the alleged disputes, discarding those …

MTD

Judge Connolly has previously denied a motion to dismiss direct infringement claims where the plaintiff at least recited the claim elements and accused a product of meeting them. Last week, though, he granted a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff did not even go that far.

Even though the patent included only method claims, plaintiff accused only products of infringing, without identifying any accused process or alleging how it is performed by those products.

Even as to those products, plaintiff contradicted itself, identifying smartphones as accused, but also discussing servers, software, and "other devices and technology." Judge Connolly called these allegations "confusing and contradictory."

Judge Connolly did grant leave to amend, and gave them a month to fix their …

Pill Bottle
Sharon McCutcheon, Unsplash

Judge Andrews on Friday accepted a defendant's argument that, during prosecution, the applicant had so clearly and unambiguously disclaimed the prior art that it warranted construing "comprising" as used in a claim element to mean "consisting essentially of"—a major narrowing of claim scope.

The claim involved an oral tablet that delivered multiple drugs, with a "barrier layer" between them. The barrier layer claim element included the word "comprising":

a barrier layer comprising hydroxyl propyl methyl cellulose 2910, polyoxyethylene glycol 400, polysorbate 80, and titanium dioxide . . .

The portion after "comprising" in the claim element matches the composition of a commercially-available barrier layer called "Opadry ®White (YS-1-7003)."

The Court found disclaimer based on …

michal-parzuchowski-oT-XbATcoTQ-unsplash.jpg
Poker Night, Michał Parzuchowski, Unsplash

On Monday, Judge Connolly issued a Memorandum Order squarely rejecting the notion that requiring a patentee to drop asserted claims for case management purposes violates due process.

Claim narrowing is one of those issues in patent law that is frequently litigated, but rarely produces a full opinion. Often, a plaintiff asserts a monstrously large number of claims, the defendant then complains that a trial on 396 claims is impossible, and the plaintiff notes that requiring them to drop the claims implicates due process. Then, everything is teed up for a discovery dispute resulting in a brief oral order narrowing the case without significant analysis.

The dispute in VLSI Technology LLC v. Intel Corporation …

Stealth
Jaroslav Devia, Unsplash

Speaking of MILs, Chief Judge Stark recently denied two motions that were, "in reality, motions for summary judgment" masquerading as MILs. Xcoal Energy & Res. v. Bluestone Energy Sales Corp., C.A. No. 18-819-LPS (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2020).

The motions were framed as MILS to exclude evidence on the defendants' "fraud-based claims and defenses" and their claim for lost profits. But they actually sought "judgment on particular claims and defenses[,]" and they didn't even mention the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The judge denied the motions outright, explaining that:

“[M]otions in limine should not be used as disguised motions for summary judgment.” Brown v. Oakland County, 2015 WL 5317194 at *2 (E.D. …

Water Heater, U.S. Pat. No. 8,375,897

Chief Judge Stark today issued a memorandum order addressing MILs and setting procedures for an August 14 remote bench trial in a single-patent competitor case about gas water heaters.

These kinds of pre-trial opinions are often interesting because they are issued so close to trial and can have such a big effect. Interesting points:

  • He denied all 5 MILs. These include MILs to preclude or exclude:
    • Testing data and other evidence as inconsistent with claim construction
    • Evidence or argument regarding a new construction of an unconstrued term, although he will construe it later if needed (citing O2 Micro)
    • Evidence of a non-infringing alternative; the fact that the NAI was never marketed was not dispositive
    • Expert testimony …

In an appeal from a Judge Battalion case in the District of Delaware, the Federal Circuit today held that—unsurprisingly—a jury may answer the fact question of whether a patent is standards essential.

It held that the argument to the contrary, that the Court must determine whether a patent is standards-essential during claim construction, was based on a misreading of precedent.

When mounting a Section 101 challenge, it is tempting to reduce the claimed invention to the broadest abstract concept possible (for example, "communications" or "data transfer"). The Federal Circuit has not given defendants much incentive to be more selective or specific in that regard. However, there are limits, and the defendants in APS Techs. v. Vertex Downhole, Inc., C.A. No. 19-1166-MN found them.

Oil Rig
Oil Rig Worksite Ltd, Unsplash

In a July 29, 2020 order Judge Noreika denied defendants' motion to dismiss because defendants' Section 101 challenge "oversimplified the claim to an improper level of abstraction." Defendants asserted that the claims were directed - at their heart - to "data transmission." Although Judge Noreika expressed some …