A Blog About Intellectual Property Litigation and the District of Delaware


Writing this blog, I sometimes feel like an especially jaded film critic. Having seen so much, I can no longer get a thrill from from a well-constructed plot and competent acting. I can only be excited by Croatian claymation about murderous cetaceans, or a silent black and white documentary about a cat who eats figs.

It lacks a certain je ne sais quoi in color . . .
It lacks a certain je ne sais quoi in color . . . Tijana Drndarski, Unsplash

All this is that I love a novel theory, and by Jove I've got one for you today.

In Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Technical Consumer Prods., Inc., C.A. No. 23-186-JNR (D. Del. May 2, 2024), Samsung sued both the overseas manufacturer and seller of allegedly infringing products in one action. The seller moved to sever and stay the claims against it under the "customer suit" exception, arguing that the manufacturer was the "true defendant," while its role was "merely peripheral."

This was a bit odd, because the customer suit exception normally applies to cases where the actions are proceeding in different venues:

[C]ustomer-suit exception cases “typically arise” in the context of forum-shopping, “when related patent infringement actions are pending in different jurisdictions[.]” Basically, courts have concluded that the normal first-filed priority will give way when a suit against the re-seller was the first one filed. . . .Though courts have applied the exception when the manufacturer and re-seller are defendants in the same suit, they still do so with principles of forum selection in mind. For example, the customer-suit exception would apply if it would mean staying the case as to the re-seller to then transfer the case to a different and more appropriate venue for the lawsuit against the manufacturer.

Id. at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).

Judge Ranjan denied the motion, finding that the customer-suit exception did not provide a "general exception to a lawsuit against a manufacturer and re-seller":

The circumstances of this case don’t concern dueling lawsuits or forum selection issues, as there are no separate competing lawsuits, and no Defendant has contested venue or jurisdiction or would seek transfer to a different venue. Moreover, HGC and TCP are represented by the same counsel, so the inefficiencies created by forcing a “true defendant” and an unrelated “peripheral defendant,” such as one among many customers of the “true defendant,” to litigate together are absent here. In short, HGC hasn’t proffered a reason for the Court to grant its motion that furthers the spirit of the customer-suit exception.

Id. at 3.

Well it was a nice try anyway. The whole opinion is worth a read and goes into greater depth on the efficiencies that might be gained or lost by severance in similar situations.

"Our data is still data, much like this car is technically still a car." Robert Bagramov, Unsplash

On Friday, the Court issued an opinion rejecting a Daubert motion where the expert relied on third-party data to calculate damages, even though arguably better data was available from the parties.

I don't think there is anything particularly surprising about this ruling, but it's concisely put and a good reminder of a basic fact of expert reports: expert's don't have to use the best data, they only have to have "good grounds":

Defendants do not challenge the methodology that [plaintiff's expert] Ms. Bennis employs, but rather assert that the bases of that methodology are so far removed from the case as to …

Eject Button
Brian De Groodt, Unsplash

We post often about how the Court handles Markman, and how much leeway the judges will give parties in seeking to construe terms (hint: it's usually 10 terms or less—and, these days, that's the total number, not the 10 terms per patent of old.).

This week, after parties in a case before Judge Hall sought construction of 18 terms, the Court vacated the Markman hearing and briefing schedule, and deferred all construction to the case dispositive motions stage (seemingly without additional pages):

ORAL ORDER: The parties have submitted a joint claim chart (D.I. 105 ) with 18 terms in dispute including, for example, "calculate" and "random." Defendants contend that 9 of the 18 disputed …

As we've mentioned previously, it has been Judge Andrews' practice for the past couple years to summarily reject filings that seal exhibits in their entirety, with an order like the following:

Aretm Kniaz, Unsplash
The redacted filings (D.I. 453 , 454 , and 458 ) are REJECTED because parts of them are redacted in their entirety. Absent a compelling reason, supported by a statement under oath by a party, redactions in their entirety are impermissible; redactions must be done so as to redact the least possible amount of the materials submitted. Failure to make a good faith attempt at such redactions may result in sanctions, the most common of which would be simply unsealing the entire filing. Redacting …

Stick Figures Fighting
AI-Generated

For attorneys who practice in D. Del., Judge Connolly's opinion yesterday in Pharmacyclics LLC v. Alvogen Pine Brook LLC, C.A. No. 19-434-CFC (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2024) is a real page turner, and well worth reading. If you want to avoid spoilers, go read it now! It's attached below, and it's only 11 pages.

Spoilers below:


It's rare for a judge to conclude that either side—let alone both—misled the Court and litigated vexatiously. But that's just what Judge Connolly found here, after the plaintiff moved for fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

In holding that the defendants litigated vexatiously, the Court offered two primary examples of their misdeeds. The first relates to unsupportable allegations …

Working in patent law for as long as I have, I've developed a fair collection of dictionaries I can turn to when I'm working on a Markman brief and require a bit of support.

(Eds. Note - It's also useful for playing especially cutthroat games of scrabble!)

You can tell whoever took this picture has never actually played scrabble.
You can tell whoever took this picture has never actually played scrabble. Brett Jordan, Unsplash

Perusing these tomes has given me an appreciation for the subtle art of the dictionary and the intense (bordering on worrisome) logophilia of those who create them. I am a particular fan of the OED's practice of including quotations featuring the usage of the word, beginning with the first extant, and showing its varying usages throughout history.

(Eds. Note—I swear, I'm not as lame as this post makes me sound. I just think writing a dictionary would be fun . . . .)

The lesson of todays case, Astellas Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., C.A. No. 23-819-JFB-CJB, D.I. 200 (D. Del. Apr. 19, 2024) (R&R), is that such artistry is best left for the dictionaries.

The patent in Astellas required treatment with a controlled release formulation "such that the treating is with a reduced food effect." The defendant (opposing a request for preliminary injunction) argued that "reduced" food effect was an indefinite term of degree. In support they pointed to a passage in the specification that seemed to provide several possible definitions for "reduced":

The wording “the effects by food are reduced” as used herein means, for example, a reduction by 10% or more, a reduction by 20% or more in another embodiment, and a reduction by 30% or more in still another embodiment, in comparison with Cmax of a conventional formulation. Alternatively, the term means, for example, a reduction of 10% or more with respect to the rates of decrease of Cmax and AUC in administration after food intake, in comparison with Cmax and AUC in administration in the fasted 15 state, a reduction of 20% or more in another embodiment, and a reduction of 30% or more in still another embodiment.

Astellas at 14 (quoting '451 patent, col. 7:57-67)

Judge Burke found this inconsistency persuasive, noting that ...

License for Thee
AI-Generated, displayed with permission

Maybe it's just me, but pre-trial evidentiary opinions are always fun to read. They often involve rules that don't come up in other written opinions, and all of the rulings tend to be highly impactful for trial (otherwise the parties wouldn't be spending their extremely limited pre-trial time and MILs on the issues).

We got an opinion from Judge Bryson last week on pre-trial evidentiary issues in Acceleration Bay LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., C.A. No. 16-453-WCB (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2024). There are a number of interesting rulings in it, but one in particular that is worth calling out involved whether a party can offer evidence of past licenses to prove damages. …

Colored Plants
Scott Webb, Unsplash

This decision is a bit dense, but it's on an issue that could come up in any case.

The plaintiff in TOT Power Control, S.L. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., C.A. No. 21-1305-MN (D. Del.) accused several products by name, and also stated in its infringement contentions that it would "seek discovery as to the identity of any [of the defendant's] products with substantially similar designs to the expressly listed accused products." D.I. 131.

The case progressed, and it turns out that the defendant does, indeed, have multiple products with similar names. The Court ultimately granted a motion to compel the defendant to provide financial discovery on each of the alternative products, even …

Today's case begins with what I imagine is the worst expert report ever presented in a patent case. How do I know that? Because the whole thing was 2 pages, about half of which was explaining that he was not "retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony" and thus did not have to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), but merely a summary of opinions under (a)(2)(C). The entirety of the substantive portion of the report is about the same length as this introductory paragraph, which I wrote in less time than it took me to drink a delicious diet pepsi. I was thinking about just block-quoting it here, but it really screwed with the formatting, so you'll just …

"Our two identified custodians have the 'majority' of relevant docs and any others have 'duplicative' info." Discovery dispute goes *poof*? AI-Generated, displayed with permission

In the District of Delaware, unless the parties agree otherwise, ESI discovery is guided by the Default Standard for Discovery. The Court published the Default Standard over a decade ago, and at this point quite a bit of case law has developed interpreting its various provisions.

Among other things, the Default Standard requires each party to identify "[t]he 10 custodians most likely to have discoverable information" in a case. These custodians' files will ultimately be searched as part of the document production process.

One common question is: what if we have less than 10 custodians with discoverable information? The answer to that is typically "disclose what you have," but I had not seen a case setting a standard for when a party can disclose less than 10 custodians—until this week.

In Attentive Mobile Inc. v. 317 Labs, Inc., C.A. No. 22-1163-CJB (D. Del.), Judge Burke addressed a discovery dispute where the defendant identified just four custodians. He denied a motion to compel the identification of more custodians based on an argument that the four custodians had a "majority" of the non-duplicative ...